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ABSTRACT
As terrorist threats continue, the United Nations grapples with 
the question of what measures governments should adopt to enhance 
security. This Article is the first to analyze the UN’s involvement in 
“countering violent extremism programs” (CVE) from a legal 
academic perspective. Specifically, this Article illuminates a critical 
question: What is the effect on international human rights law of 
international-level engagement with CVE? 
Preventing or countering violent extremism programs in the
United Kingdom force teachers to report signs that students are 
“vulnerable to radicalization.” In other countries, prosecutions use 
broad definitions of incitement, raising concerns about freedom of 
expression, association, and due process. National CVE programs 
create unique human rights concerns, including criticisms that: 
violent extremism is a vague term, leading to incomprehensible 
criteria; Muslims are targeted, and their beliefs are penalized and 
stigmatized; free speech is suppressed; and extremist tendencies are 
not reliably identified. Worse, some argue that when social services 
gather information, they discourage those in need from seeking 
benefits. Despite these concerns, the UN Secretary-General 
embraced CVE policies, adopting a “Plan of Action to Prevent 
Violent Extremism” in December 2015. Just one month later, the UN 
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High Commissioner for Human Rights called on nations to avoid 
sacrificing security for human rights. 
Embracing CVE will both open and foreclose opportunities to 
advance international human rights law at the international level. 
The UN Charter obliges the UN to uphold and promote human 
rights, including freedom of expression and association. This 
obligation still holds when the international organization weighs 
those rights against international and domestic terrorism. By 
embracing CVE programs, the UN has both limited and expanded its 
capacity to promote and develop human rights norms. On the one 
hand, the UN may have curtailed its ability to leverage social stigma 
against states that violate human rights norms through their CVE 
programs. This Article addresses an additional concern: The 
Secretary-General’s call for National CVE Action Plans may 
generate a drive towards uniformity among States, creating a race to 
the bottom in human rights standards, as well as redirecting 
important state resources from social services to security. On the 
other hand, this Article also analyzes some limited ways that the 
UN’s position on CVE programs may promote human-rights-
respecting outcomes. This is because the UN’s agenda will now offer 
multiple opportunities for transnational advocacy networks, and 
other stakeholders to contest CVE programs not only nationally, but 
also at the international level and through programs within the UN. 
This Article fills a gap in existing international 
law/international relations approaches to norm development by 
showing how international organizations can stifle rather than 
merely promote human rights norms at the international level. Given 
recent news reports that the U.S. President Donald Trump plans to 
rename CVE programs “Countering Islamic Extremism,” 
specifically targeting Muslim groups, this Article provides timely 
insight into some concerns of President Trump’s proposed program. 
If the United States changes its programs to “Combating Islamic 
Extremism,” the existing international model of CVE programs 
would arguably represent a higher baseline than that program, 
providing human rights advocates leverage in the United States.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article is the first to focus on the preliminary effects of 
the United Nations’ (UN’s) coordinated embrace of countering 
violent extremism (CVE) programs on security and human rights at 
the international level. Since 2014, a relatively new and concerted 
focus on prevention of “violent extremism” has been central to the
UN’s anti-terror efforts. International law scholars have described 
the “regulatory” turn in international law,1 and engaged many of the 
normative concerns raised by the impacts of internationally 
coordinated counterterrorism efforts on human rights law.2 This 
Article fills a gap in this literature by analyzing the international, 
transnational, and correspondingly national move to employing 
“softer” programs to “prevent” radicalization.
1. Jacob Katz Cogan, The Regulatory Turn in International Law, 52 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 322, 324 n.15 (2011) (“‘Consequently, “regulation” is not being 
employed here in connection with, as in global administrative law scholarship, a 
particular form of international lawmaking.’ See Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & 
Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 17 (2005). ‘[G]lobal administrative action is rulemaking, 
adjudications, and other decisions that are neither treaty-making nor simple dispute 
settlements between parties.’; see also Nico Krisch & Benedict Kingsbury, 
Introduction: Global Governance and Global Administrative Law in the 
International Legal Order, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1, 3 (2006) (describing global 
administrative law as ‘the setting and application of rules by bodies that are not 
legislative or primarily adjudicative in character’). The general idea of regulation 
used here may be quite similar to the one applied in the domestic context (if we 
think of that term, broadly speaking, as governmental control of or influence on 
individual behavior). Yet, because of the particular structure in which international 
law operates, many of the institutional implications, manifestations, and dynamics of 
regulation in the national setting are not perfectly translatable into the transnational 
sphere. That is not to say, certainly, that the lessons of domestic experience or the 
methodologies and approaches of domestic law scholars do not apply or are not 
helpful—they do and they are. Rather, it is that the distinctive international 
architecture must always be taken into account when doing so. For one helpful 
attempt, among many, on analyzing the distinctive nature of international 
architecture, see Daniel C. Esty, Good Governance at the Supranational Scale: 
Globalizing Administrative Law, 115 YALE L.J. 1490 (2006). See also Kristen E. 
Boon, U.N. Sanctions as Regulation, 15 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 543, 546 (2016).”). 
2. See generally PETER ROMANIUK, DOES CVE WORK?: LESSONS LEARNED 
FROM THE GLOBAL EFFORT TO COUNTER VIOLENT EXTREMISM 1 (2015) [hereinafter 
DOES CVE WORK]; Clive Walker, The Impact of Contemporary Security Agendas 
Against Terrorism on the Substantive Criminal Law, in POST 9/11 AND THE STATE OF 
PERMANENT LEGAL EMERGENCY: SECURITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN COUNTERING 
TERRORISM 121 (Aniceto Masferrer ed., 2012).
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As the international community once again moves beyond the 
dichotomy of criminal law and armed conflict by endorsing 
preventive means of countering extremism,3 its resulting quasi-
regulatory frameworks trigger implications for human rights law and 
security. This analysis finds that the UN’s endorsement of CVE 
programs has both opened and foreclosed opportunities to advance 
international human rights law and security at the national and 
international levels.4
The term “violent extremism” has been winding through the 
UN system for some time but has only recently come of age. The 
media, legislators, and policymakers increasingly use the term 
“violent extremists,” or simply “extremists,” as synonyms for 
terrorists.5 In 2014, the UN Security Council called on States to 
address “violent extremism” as a cause of terrorism in Resolution 
2178.6 Then, in December 2015, the UN Secretary-General broadly 
endorsed CVE programs in his “Plan of Action to Prevent Violent 
Extremism” (the Plan of Action).7 This Plan of Action unites aspects 
of the General Assembly’s Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy with 
the Security Council’s earlier endorsement of States’ use of criminal 
law and community engagement to prevent “violent extremism.”8
While this international-level embrace of CVE is relatively 
recent, at the national level, many States have already implemented 
various forms of CVE programs.9 For example, under the United 
Kingdom’s PREVENT program, to “prevent or counter violent 
extremism,” teachers must now report signs that particular students 
are “vulnerable to radicalization.”10 In the United States, the Obama 
3. See, e.g., Simon Bronitt & Susan Donkin, Australian Responses to 9/11: 
New World Legal Hybrids?, in POST 9/11 AND THE STATE OF PERMANENT LEGAL 
EMERGENCY: SECURITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN COUNTERING TERRORISM 223, 224 
(Aniceto Masferrer ed., 2012); Walker, supra note 2, at 121, 134.
4. A work in progress by the Author more closely examines the national-
level impacts of the international-level embrace of CVE programs. 
5. The precise boundaries and relationship between violent extremism and 
terrorism are unclear, as described further in this Note. See infra Section II.D.
6. S.C. Res. 2178, ¶ 18 (Sept. 24, 2014).
7. U.N. Secretary-General, Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, ¶ 
5, U.N. Doc. A/70/674 (Dec. 24, 2015) [hereinafter Secretary-General Plan of 
Action to Prevent Violent Extremism].
8. Compare id. ¶¶ 5, 7, with G.A. Res. 60/288, U.N. Global Counter-
Terrorism Strategy (Sept. 8, 2006), and S.C. Res. 2178, supra note 6, ¶ 1. Violent 
extremism, here, is defined differently than terrorism. Id.
9. See infra Part I. 
10. Prevent aims to stop people from becoming terrorists or supporting 
terrorism, as one prong of a multi-prong national program called Contest. The other 
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Administration began work on “building bridges” with communities 
to fight extremism around 2011.11 In pilot cities in the United States, 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Homeland 
Security,12 and the Department of Justice reached out to civil 
society13—including community stakeholders—for assistance 
prongs are Pursue, which aims to stop terrorist attacks by detecting, prosecuting, 
and otherwise disrupting those who plot to carry out attacks against the UK or its 
interests overseas; Protect to strengthen protection against a terrorist attack in the 
UK or against its interests overseas and so reduce their vulnerability; and Prepare to 
mitigate the impact of a terrorist attack where that attack cannot be stopped. DEP’T
FOR EDUC., THE PREVENT DUTY: DEPARTMENTAL ADVICE FOR SCHOOL AND 
CHILDCARE PROVIDERS, 1, 5 (2015) [hereinafter THE PREVENT DUTY],
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/4395
98/prevent-duty-departmental-advice-v6.pdf [https://perma.cc/UU84-49ZC]. The 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) has adopted a 
different acronym, VERLT, to describe and distinguish violent extremism. VERLT 
is violent extremism and radicalization that leads to terrorism. Youth Engagement to 
Counter Violent Extremism and Radicalization That Lead to Terrorism, ORG. FOR 
SECURITY & CO-OPERATION EUR. (Oct. 23-24, 2012), http://www.osce.org/atu/
103352?download=true [https://perma.cc/CED9-QMNF]. Some of the difficulties 
with programs like those in Prevent are discussed infra.
11. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, STRATEGIC IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR 
EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS TO PREVENT VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE UNITED 
STATES 1, 2 (Dec. 2011), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/
2016_strategic_implementation_plan_empowering_local_partners_prev.pdf [https://
perma.cc/XEM7-8LRM] (“The [United States] Federal Government is focused on 
three core areas of activity: (1) enhancing engagement with and support to local 
communities that may be targeted by violent extremists; (2) building government 
and law enforcement expertise for preventing violent extremism; and (3) countering 
violent extremist propaganda while promoting our ideals.”). See id. at 6 
(“Departments and agencies will be responsible for assessing their specific activities 
in pursuit of [Strategic Implementation Plan] objectives, in coordination with an 
Assessment Working Group. We will develop a process for identifying gaps, areas 
of limited progress, resource needs, and any additional factors resulting from new 
information on the dynamics of radicalization to violence. Our progress will be 
evaluated and reported annually to the President.”).
12. Roxy Kennedy, DHS Turning to Communities to Combat Violent 
Extremism, HOMELAND SECURITY DIGITAL LIBR. (Nov. 4, 2016), https://
www.hsdl.org/c/dhs-turning-to-communities-to-combat-violent-extremism/ [https://
perma.cc/J9WX-FWZ9]. 
13. For purposes of this Article, I borrow Cohen and Arato’s working 
definition of civil society. Civil society is “a sphere of social interaction between 
economy and state, composed above all of the intimate sphere (especially the 
family), the sphere of associations (especially voluntary associations), social 
movements, and forms of public communication.” JEAN L. COHEN & ANDREW 
ARATO, CIVIL SOCIETY AND POLITICAL THEORY ix (1994). Civil society is not 
composed of political organizations and political societies of parties, as these forms 
of organizations “are directly involved with state power and economic production, 
which they seek to [] manage.” Id.
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identifying those most vulnerable to radicalization in order to help 
them build so-called “resilience.”14
Such preventive CVE programs may offer the virtue of 
avoiding the harsh penalties of criminal law or military enforcement,
but also raise concerns relating to freedom of religion, opinion, 
speech, and expression. Yet these preventive CVE programs are 
increasingly popular as States interpret their obligations to protect 
populations from terrorism15 as permitting state intervention, even at 
the pre-criminal phase in individuals’ behavior or mere beliefs. The 
Secretary-General’s Plan of Action arguably invites such 
interpretations by States. It fails to define violent extremism,
characterizing it as a “diverse phenomenon, without clear 
definition,”16 and a phenomenon that both springs from and enables 
14. OFF. PARTNER ENGAGEMENT, PREVENTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN 
SCHOOLS 1 (Jan. 2016), https://info.publicintelligence.net/FBI-
PreventingExtremismSchools.pdf [https://perma.cc/9R37-3YRA]; Building 
Community Resilience Minneapolis-St. Paul Pilot Program a Community-Led Local 
Framework, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 5 (2015) [hereinafter Building Community 
Resilience], https://www.justice.gov/usao-mn/file/642121/download [https://
perma.cc/CE46-S47A]; Laura Yuen, Muslims Fear Anti-Terror Program Could Spy 
on Their Communities, MPR NEWS (Jan. 30, 2015), 
http://www.mprnews.org/story/2015/01/30/anti-terror-program [https://perma.cc/
U5ZQ-LAAE] (“[I]n 2009, FBI headquarters directed Minneapolis and five 
additional cities to gather intelligence on Somali-Americans under the guise of 
community outreach, according to an internal document obtained by the Brennan 
Center through a Freedom of Information Act request. The memo directed the field 
offices to co-mingle the FBI’s investigative activities with community outreach.”).
15. See generally Building Community Resilience Minneapolis-St. Paul 
Pilot Program a Community-Led Local Framework, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 5
(2015), https://www.justice.gov/usao-mn/file/642121/download [https://
perma.cc/9SBH-Y2RK] [hereinafter Building Community Resilience]; Building 
Resilience Against Terrorism, GOV’T CAN. (2013), https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/
cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/rslnc-gnst-trrrsm/rslnc-gnst-trrrsm-eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/F823-
TWCN]; Countering Violent Extremism, LIVING SAFE TOGETHER,
https://www.livingsafetogether.gov.au/aboutus/Documents/
CVEStrategyFactSheet.pdf (last visited Jan. 8, 2018) [https://perma.cc/HAG3-
ETGD]; The Los Angeles Framework for Countering Violent Extremism, DEP’T
HOMELAND SEC. (2015), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Los%
20Angeles%20Framework%20for%20CVE-Full%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/
NP5A-HZEA]. The definition of terrorism itself remains widely variable and 
debated. See, e.g., Marcello Di Filippo, The Definition(s) of Terrorism in 
International Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
TERRORISM 3 (Ben Saul ed., 2014) (discussing various existing international-level 
definitions and debates about their meaning).
16. See Secretary-General Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism,
supra note 7, ¶ 2 (“Definitions of ‘terrorism’ and ‘violent extremism’ are the 
prerogative of Member States and must be consistent with their obligations under 
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“conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism.”17 In the Plan of 
Action, the Secretary-General makes over seventy broad 
recommendations directed toward states, regions, and countries at 
the international level.
The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has repeatedly 
emphasized that the global community faces a challenge to continue 
promoting human rights in the face of security concerns. Normative 
tension inevitably arises as the UN seeks to balance its rights-
respecting obligations, including the duty to protect life, with many 
States’ goals of curbing international and domestic terrorism. As 
Professor Scheppele and others have noted, it is challenging for the 
UN to coordinate anti-terrorism efforts when governance in many 
States is neither fair nor transparent.18 Other scholars have shown 
that since 9/11, even States with “good governance” have created 
“hybrid” specialized processes and laws for terrorism that effectively 
widen the grasp of State power and lower protections for 
defendants.19 The international law literature has focused on the 
impacts of the Security Council’s counterterrorism regimes, 
including its travel and other restrictions applied to curb the foreign-
international law, in particular international human rights law. Just as the General 
Assembly has taken a practical approach to counter-terrorism through the adoption 
by consensus of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, this Plan of 
Action pursues a practical approach to preventing violent extremism, without 
venturing to address questions of definition.”).
17. G.A. Res. 60/288, supra note 8; Secretary-General Plan of Action to 
Prevent Violent Extremism, supra note 7, ¶ 5.
18. See, e.g., Kim Lane Scheppele, The International Standardization of 
National Security Law, 4 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 437, 451 (2010) (“The problem 
with the rights-violating aspects of the Security Council framework, then, is not with 
the intentions of the Security Council, but with the terrible quality of governance in 
many states in the world — and that is not the Security Council’s fault.”).
19. See, e.g., Bronitt & Donkin, supra note 3, at 224; Kim Lane Scheppele, 
Law in a Time of Emergency: States of Exception and the Temptations of 9/11, 6 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 1001 (2004); Kent Roach, Sources and Trends in Post 9-11 Anti-
Terrorism Laws, in SECURITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 227 (Benjamin J. Goold & Liora 
Lazarus eds., 2007); Sudha Setty, Comparative Perspectives on Specialized Trials 
for Terrorism, 63 ME. L. REV. 131, 153 (2010) (arguing that changes in the United 
States’, United Kingdom’s, and India’s laws and policies raise concerns about the 
effects of counterterrorism regimes on human rights). For purposes of this Article, 
“good governance” can be understood as being: participatory, consensus-oriented, 
accountable, transparent, responsive, effective and efficient, equitable and inclusive, 
and committed to following the rule of law. Good Governance and Human Rights,
U.N. HUMAN RTS. OFF. HIGH COMM’R, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/
Development/GoodGovernance/Pages/GoodGovernanceIndex.aspx [https://
perma.cc/H8L7-2YY9] (last visited Jan. 8, 2018).
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terrorist-fighter phenomenon. However, the literature has not yet 
assessed the evolving effects of the UN’s embrace of preventive and 
de-radicalization CVE programs on rule of law, security, and human 
rights, creating a void in international and domestic legal 
scholarship. 
The UN’s endorsement of CVE programs affects international 
human rights law by both opening and foreclosing opportunities for 
the UN to advance international human rights law at the international 
level.20 As explained further below, as is true with many 
counterterror programs, the UN’s embrace of CVE programs 
arguably enables States to curtail certain human rights and risks 
driving down international-level understandings of the baseline for 
rights protections.21 Although the UN Secretary-General’s policy 
emphasizes the critical role of human rights law in moderating CVE 
programs, it does not offer further specifics.22 The UN’s embrace of
CVE may also offer prima facie goals of legitimacy to States’ 
problematic CVE programs. Professor Scheppele noted that 
relatively widespread State compliance with the Security Council’s 
Resolution 1373 counterterrorism regime offered cover to rights-
abusing States. In an analogous fashion, States are likely to regard 
the UN’s endorsement of CVE programs as ratifying their own 
national codifications of “extremism” crimes despite these regimes’ 
potential conflict with their international human rights obligations. 
This is all the more concerning because whether preventive CVE de-
20. A work in progress by the Author more closely examines the national-
level impacts of the international-level embrace of CVE programs. 
21. U.N. Secretary General, Note, Promotion and Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, ¶ 22, 23, U.N. 
Doc. A/66/310 (Aug. 18, 2011) (stating that States cite their duty to protect citizens 
as vindicating their focus on CVE). See Secretary-General Plan of Action to Prevent 
Violent Extremism, supra note 7, ¶ 8 (“United Nations entities, including the 
Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force and the United Nations Counter-
Terrorism Centre, the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, the 
United Nations Development Programme, the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, the United 
Nations Alliance of Civilizations, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations of the 
Secretariat, the Peacebuilding Support Office and the United Nations Entity for 
Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women), and my Envoy on 
Youth, as well as many other members of the United Nations family, have been 
working on issues relevant to preventing violent extremism.”).
22. See, e.g., Secretary-General Plan of Action to Prevent Violent 
Extremism, supra note 7, ¶ 5.
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radicalization programs in fact promote security is at best uncertain,23
even though their effects on freedom of opinion, expression, and 
association can certainly be problematic.24 At the same time, from a 
human rights and security perspective, many of the CVE programs 
discussed here may be less problematic than many “hard” 
counterterror tools such as targeted killing, interrogation, preventive 
detention, surveillance, or the penalties of criminal law. 
Indeed, the news about the UN’s embrace of CVE is not 
entirely negative for human rights norms or security. Some UN 
entities are contesting problematic aspects of CVE programs and 
working to hold both the UN and States accountable for respecting 
rights. This is particularly true of Special Rapporteurs on human 
rights and human rights bodies staffed by independent experts.25 This 
analysis suggests that institutional design and membership may 
influence the willingness and capacity of various bodies to contest 
norms. The UN’s endorsement of CVE also provides opportunities to 
develop norms at the international level that may not otherwise be 
robustly contested at the national level. National-level courts and 
legislatures vary widely in their willingness—and ability—to 
respond when the State exercises power, and they are particularly 
weak when it comes to security threats or members of groups seen as 
threats to State power.26 Transnational advocacy groups might 
leverage alleged violations of human rights norms to international 
fora to remove them from unyielding national-level authorities, thus 
increasing scrutiny and promoting accountability of state authorities. 
Examining the international endorsement of CVE programs 
thus has important implications for recent theories about the 
dynamics and interplay of international rule of law with national rule 
23. See infra Part III; see also Special Rapporteur, Human Rights 
Council, Report on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, ¶¶ 36-37, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/31/65 (Feb. 22, 2016); Special Rapporteur, Human Rights Council,
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While 
Countering Terrorism, ¶ 15, U.N. Doc. A/70/371 (Sept. 18, 2015).
24. See infra Part III; see also Special Rapporteur A/HRC/31/65, supra note 
23, ¶ 37; Special Rapporteur A/70/371, supra note 23, ¶ 15.
25. See generally infra Part II. 
26. Compare, e.g., Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 40 
(2010) (upholding a law characterizing training on humanitarian law as material 
support to terrorist organizations), with Sec’y State for the Home Dep’t v. MB 
[2007] UKHL 46 [44] (Eng.) (striking down control orders for individuals suspected 
of terrorism).
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of law.27 The role of international institutions in thwarting—as
opposed to promoting—norm compliance is generally 
undertheorized.28 In this case, the UN advances States’ non-
derogable duty to protect lives, while at the same time possibly 
undermining, for example, its arguably non-derogable duty to protect 
and promote freedom of opinion and expression. Further study of 
developments in international-level CVE policy is recommended. As 
this Article goes to print, the UN Security Council has endorsed a 
“comprehensive international framework to counter terrorist 
narratives.”29
Although the issue of the role of the UN in promoting human 
rights continues to be debated in the international law literature, this 
Article assumes that the United Nations has a legal obligation not to 
interfere with the human rights protected by human rights treaties.30
27. See generally MICHAEL ZÜRN ET AL., RULE OF LAW DYNAMICS IN AN 
ERA OF INTERNATIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE 5 (Michael Zürn et al. 
eds., 2012).
28. See id. at 12-17.
29. See S.C. Res. 2354, ¶ 1 (May 24, 2017); S.C. Pres. Statement 
2016/6 (May 11, 2016); Proposal for Comprehensive International Framework to 
Counter Terrorist Narratives, transmitted by Letter dated 26 April 2017 from the 
Chair of the Security Council Comm. Established Pursuant to Resolution 1373 
(2001) Concerning Counter-Terrorism Addressed to the President of the Security 
Council, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/2017/375 (Apr. 28, 2017).
30. The UN is, of course, not a party to human rights treaties, but various 
organs or bodies of the UN have an explicit duty to promote human rights, 
including, for example, the Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights. In 
addition, the Secretary-General of the UN has affirmed the importance of promoting 
human rights to the mission of the UN. The UN Charter affirms human rights 
multiple times in the preamble and text: “[T]o reaffirm faith in fundamental human 
rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and 
women and of nations large and small[.]” U.N. Charter pmbl. “The Purposes of the 
United Nations are . . . [t]o achieve international cooperation in solving international 
problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in 
promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms 
for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion[.]” Id. at art. 1, ¶ 3. 
“The General Assembly shall initiate studies and make recommendations for the 
purpose of . . . promoting international cooperation in the economic, social, cultural, 
educational, and health fields, and assisting in the realization of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or 
religion.” Id. at art. 13, ¶ 1(b). 
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being 
which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations 
based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination 
of peoples, the United Nations shall promote: a. higher standards of 
living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress 
and development; b. solutions of international economic, social, health, 
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In circumstances such as these, wherein the UN directs States to take 
steps to prevent radicalization, it should therefore offer States 
guidance about how to do so without violating human rights 
standards. The UN advances rights-respecting norms through many 
of its organs, agencies, and bodies on the one hand. But its 
endorsement of CVE policies also has offered legitimacy to 
preventive programs that have, for example, been perceived as 
disproportionately targeting Muslim communities. As described 
here, the UN’s general endorsement may reduce pressure on States to 
comply with international human rights norms.31
In Part I, this Article first surveys various emerging CVE 
programs and discusses the programs’ related successes and 
criticisms. Part II takes a preliminary look at the interaction of CVE 
programs with the basic legal framework of human rights of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR).32 Part III argues that the UN’s overly broad endorsement 
of preventive CVE programs dilutes international human rights 
norms and encourages States’ deference to the vague and potentially 
human rights-compromising standards embraced by the UN. Part IV 
contends that these issues may serve as a valuable counterweight to 
States’ deference to the UN’s endorsement of vague norms, 
notwithstanding dissent within the UN, particularly from non-state, 
and related problems; and international cultural and educational 
cooperation; and c. universal respect for, and observance of, human 
rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, 
sex, language, or religion. 
Id. at art. 55. “The Economic and Social Council may . . . make recommendations 
for the purpose of promoting respect for, and observance of, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all.” Id. at art. 62, ¶ 1, 2. 
31. Notwithstanding issues such as United Nations peacekeepers and sexual 
assault, the scholarly discussion about the accountability of the UN and other 
international organizations (IOs) has not yet extended so far as to hold IOs 
accountable for inadvertently lowering human rights standards. See generally Int’l 
Law Comm’n, Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, 
with Commentaries, U.N. Doc. A/66/10 (2011); Kristen E. Boon, The United 
Nations as Good Samaritan: Immunity and Responsibility, 16 CHI. J. INT’L L. 341, 
341 (2016) (arguing that “[w]hile partial immunity is justified under certain 
circumstances, the categorical assertion of absolute U.N. immunity does not survive 
an assessment of accountability, distributive justice, or economics”).
32. See generally International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 
16, 1966, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-20, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. 
Treaty Doc. No. 95-19, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR].
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relatively independent human rights bodies like the Human Rights 
Committee and Special Rapporteurs. The UN’s acceptance of CVE 
as a complement to hard counterterrorism measures might also 
provide an important alternative for States, and the UN can offer a 
valuable forum for transnational advocates challenging particular 
State implementation of CVE programs as more specific and rights-
respecting standards emerge. 
I. EMERGENT CVE: ADDING SOFTER CVE TO “HARD”
COUNTERTERRORISM APPROACHES
Notwithstanding massive domestic and multilateral security 
initiatives and the UN’s expansive, Security Council-led, post-9/11 
counter-terrorism architecture,33 terrorism today is more diffusely 
distributed than ever before according to the UN Security Council.34
The precise incidence of terrorism is difficult to establish, as 
definitions of terrorism remain elusive.35 Still, terrorist violence has 
certainly persisted and, by some accounts, has even worsened since 
9/11.36 One anecdotal report, for example, states that in recent years, 
some 25,000 individuals from more than one hundred countries are 
reported to have volunteered to join ISIL in Syria and Iraq (foreign 
33. Examples of the UN’s massive initiatives include: the UN Counter-
terrorism Centre; UN Counterterrorism Committee (CTC); UN Counter-Terrorism 
Implementation Task Force (UN CTITF); the Terrorism Prevention Branch of the 
UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC); UN Counterterrorism Center (UNCCT); 
Counterterrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED); Global 
Counterterrorism Task Forum (GCTF); INTERPOL; and Financial Action Task 
Force of Group of 7, initially set up in 1989. See United Nations Action to Counter 
Terrorism, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/counterterrorism 
[https://perma.cc/WH8S-3CF8] (last visited Jan. 8, 2018) (demonstrating that the 
CTITF, UNODC, and the UN Counterterrorism Centre are under the General 
Assembly’s mandate, not the Security Council’s). 
34. S.C. Res. 2178, supra note 6, ¶ 2.
35. See generally WALTER ENDERS & TODD SANDLER, THE POLITICAL 
ECONOMY OF TERRORISM (2d ed. 2016) (discussing empirical studies showing 
terrorist incidents have declined globally although the proportion of incidents 
resulting in death has increased). Cordesman and Jenkins calculated the total number 
of people killed worldwide by Islamic extremists in the five years after 9/11 in 
terrorist incidents outside war zones such as Iraq, Afghanistan, etc., as being 200-
300 a year. See BRIAN M. JENKINS, UNCONQUERABLE NATION: KNOWING OUR 
ENEMY, STRENGTHENING OURSELVES 179-84 (2006); ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN, THE 
CHALLENGE OF BIOLOGICAL TERRORISM 29-31 (2005).
36. See sources cited supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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terrorist fighters).37 However, other scholars, including Professors 
Enders and Sandler, point to empirical studies showing that terrorist 
incidents have declined globally although the proportion of incidents 
resulting in death have increased.38
Yet since 9/11, the UN has conducted unprecedented, 
coordinated counterterrorism efforts. Indeed, for nearly two decades 
now, the UN’s human rights bodies have been grappling with the 
effects of UN Security Council-led counterterrorism policies and 
States’ policies, such as terrorist financing regulations, drone strikes, 
secret detentions and evidence,39 electronic surveillance, and 
rendition—and now, CVE programs. This Part describes the array of 
UN approaches used in counter-terrorism with a particular focus on 
preventive CVE programs.
Faced with the limitations of ineffective, traditional “hard” 
security tools,40 it is unsurprising that international “holistic,” 
prevention-oriented41 approaches to security, such as CVE programs, 
have emerged.42 States are increasingly engaging civil society to help 
37. Ashley Kirk, Iraq and Syria: How Many Foreign Fighters Are Fighting 
for ISIL?, THE TELEGRAPH (Mar. 24, 2016, 3:45 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
news/2016/03/29/iraq-and-syria-how-many-foreign-fighters-are-fighting-for-isil/ 
(last visited Jan. 15, 2018); A foreign terrorist fighter may be considered a violent 
extremist if intercepted by the State before he succeeds in traveling to the battlefield.
See U.S. HOMELAND SEC. FINAL REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON COMBATING 
TERRORISTS AND FOREIGN FIGHTER TRAVEL (2015), https://homeland.house.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2015/09/TaskForceFinalReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/KUM4-
W9K7] (last visited at Jan. 15, 2018).
38. See sources cited supra note 35 and accompanying text.
39. See, e.g., Kent Roach, Secret Evidence and Its Alternatives, in 14 IUS 
GENTIUM: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON LAW AND JUSTICE 179, 179 (Aniceto 
Masferrer ed., 2012).
40. S.C. Pres. Statement 2010/19, at 2 (Sept. 27, 2010) (“The Security 
Council recognizes that terrorism will not be defeated by military force . . . and 
underlines the need to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, 
including, but not limited to, the need to strengthen efforts for the successful 
prevention and peaceful resolution of prolonged conflicts, and the need to promote 
the rule of law, the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, good 
governance, tolerance and inclusiveness.”). Terrorism continues, despite States’ 
many arrests, deportations, trials, indefinite detention, heightened security measures,
and even the use of torture. 
41. Although CVE policies were first conceptualized around 2004, the 
concept of prevention of harm has a much longer pedigree in law. In a separate work 
in progress, I am exploring the connections between the human security paradigm 
and CVE policies. 
42. It is beyond the scope of this Article to fully develop the multiple ways 
that the Realpolitik of the war against terror has failed to stop terrorism. On many 
accounts, however, the U.S.-led massive mobilization of resources to enhance 
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identify, engage, and preempt “radical” beliefs and pre-criminal 
behavior, loosely termed “violent extremism.”43 Before the UN 
broadly endorsed CVE programs, States implemented CVE 
programs as a supplement to their traditional programs.44 For 
example, “Prevent” is a part of the United Kingdom’s “Contest”
program.45 Prevent builds on local partnerships46 to “safeguard[] and 
promot[e] the welfare of children in the[] local area,” which takes
place under Local Safeguarding Children Boards (LSCBs).47
According to the British government, 
There is no single way of identifying an individual who is likely to be 
susceptible to a terrorist ideology. As with managing other safeguarding 
risks, staff should be alert to changes in children’s behaviour which could 
indicate that they may be in need of help or protection. Children at risk of 
radicalisation may display different signs or seek to hide their views.48
All young children are the audience of this component of the Prevent 
program. Regardless of the lack of specificity in warning signs, “the 
statutory guidance refers to the importance of Prevent awareness 
training to equip staff to identify children at risk of being drawn into 
terrorism and to challenge extremist ideas. The [United Kingdom’s] 
Home Office developed a core training product for this purpose—
Workshop to Raise Awareness of Prevent (WRAP).”49
CVE programs such as this one, sometimes also termed 
“preventing violent extremism” programs, are animated by States’ 
concerns that ideology is a threat to security. With its vague 
boundaries of fields of practice,50 CVE “has emerged rapidly in 
security has exacerbated tensions with many States of the non-aligned movement, 
and States where development is the primary concern. See Jean-Marie Guehenno, 10
Conflicts to Watch in 2017, FOREIGN POL’Y (Jan. 5, 2017), 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/01/05/10-conflicts-to-watch-in-2017/ [https://
perma.cc/UDV8-43XG]. 
43. See Mareike Schomerus & Sherine El Taraboulsi-McCarthy, 
Countering Violent Extremism, GSDRC, http://www.gsdrc.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/03/CVE.pdf [https://perma.cc/5LEW-YD34] (last visited Jan. 
8, 2018).
44. The Duty to Prevent, for example, predates the Secretary-General’s 
Action Plan on Countering Violent Extremism. Compare THE PREVENT DUTY, supra
note 10, with Secretary-General Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, supra 
note 7.
45. See THE PREVENT DUTY, supra note 10, at 3.
46. Id. at 7.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 6.
49. Id. at 7.
50. DOES CVE WORK, supra note 2, at 33.
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recent years and represents the most significant development in 
counter-terrorism over that time.”51 Violent extremism has been 
defined in various ways at the national level,52 but all definitions 
represent concepts broader than the concept of terrorism.53
We might understand CVE programs through their goals. They 
may target either acts or beliefs: on the one hand, cognitive 
radicalization is defined as the possession of extremist beliefs or 
feelings, or on the other, behavioral radicalization is defined as the 
promotion of violent acts.54 Or CVE programs could be analyzed 
according to the public policy underlying the program. For example, 
at the national level, CVE prevention programs have targeted online 
fora, as well as foreign policy and development work.55 They might 
also be integrated into domestic social services, including “funding, 
research and other support for youth programming and mentoring,”
and expanded employment opportunities.56 CVE programs might 
target various combinations of cognitive or behavioral “ills” at the 
micro-, meso-, and universal-levels. 
51. Id. at v.
52. Special Rapporteur, supra note 23, ¶ 4; see also Human Rights Comm., 
General Comment No. 34, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34 (Sept. 12, 2011) [hereinafter 
General Comment No. 34].
53. The definition of terrorism itself remains widely variable and debated. 
See, e.g., Di Filippo, supra note 15, at 3 (discussing various existing international-
level definitions and debates about their meaning). 
54. DOES CVE WORK, supra note 2, at 8.
55. Id. at 33. 
56. See, e.g., Building Community Resilience, supra note 15, at 5 (“There 
will be two intervention models developed, one working within the school systems 
and one working within the community. Both will be community-led. The school 
model will expand a current model within connects youth workers from the 
community, bridging the gap between youth, their parents and the school system. 
These workers will spend time in the lunch-room and in non-classroom settings, 
building relationships and trust at school. They will provide connections and 
continuity during school and after for both parents and the students. The second 
intervention model is based on community volunteers, with mothers, community 
organizations, religious leaders and mental health professionals working directly 
with families before law enforcement is ever involved.”).
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CVE programs overlap many different domains. In various 
ways, with different levels of intervention, all of these programs seek 
to disrupt the so-called “radicalization process.” As a basic tool for 
distinguishing between types of CVE programs, Table 1 shows both 
the specific foci of CVE programs as well as applications of these 
programs.57 For example, under “rehabilitative” CVE programs are 
programs offering “reprogramming programs” as an alternative to 
criminal law detention and punishment in select “violent extremist” 
cases. In practice, boundaries between CVE programs are not always 
as clear. As Table 1 indicates, they may incorporate any and all of 
these foci and applications, select aspects, or just one.
Moving from “rehabilitation” in Table 1 to the right are those 
CVE programs with a focus on “reintegration,” “prevention,” 
“partnering with civil society,” and “on conditions conducive to 
terrorism.” On this move to the right, these programs involve 
governments’ use of gradually soft(er) power, or non-coercive 
means, to dissuade often increasingly larger groups of people from 
using violence. CVE programs generally have three components: 
engagement, prevention, and intervention.58
CVE programs can be analyzed from different perspectives. 
For example, one analytic approach would focus on the level of 
society at which the CVE program is directed. Consistent with the 
prevention terminology of criminological or public health 
57. The Author is grateful to Corri Zoli for sharing this table. 
58. See id. at 4.
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approaches, a particular CVE intervention might focus on the 
“universal” level, or in other words be aimed at the whole 
population; programs at a “secondary” level would only be directed 
to at-risk groups; and those at a “tertiary” or “indicative” level would 
only engage those individuals determined to be high-risk.59
A. States’ Militaristic and Law Enforcement Counterterrorism 
Policies and the Move Toward Preventing “Extremism”
As elaborated in Part II, the programs that are particularly 
concerning are those “secondary” or “meso-level” preventive CVE 
programs that target pre-criminal beliefs or behavior.60 Yet these 
“softer” CVE approaches may also be more politically acceptable to 
a wider array of States because they embrace the General 
Assembly’s focus on prevention of terrorism in addition to the 
Security Council’s focus on “hard security” to eradicate terrorism. 
Over the past decade and a half, Non-aligned Movement States in the 
General Assembly and various civil society groups have invited this 
mix of development and security goals.61
States working in the international, transnational, and national 
spheres have gradually embraced not only the extensive 
counterterrorism architecture, but also CVE’s preventive focus, 
which overlaps with the General Assembly’s Global 
Counterterrorism Strategy pillar addressing the “conditions 
conducive to the spread of terrorism.”62 The General Assembly’s63
and the UN Security Council’s responses to—and prioritization of—
terrorism historically have different points of emphasis. 
59. DOES CVE WORK, supra note 2, at 9, 27-29. Analogously, some policy 
experts speak of “macro-, meso- and micro-level” foci for CVE approaches. Id.
60. See infra Part II. 
61. This point is further developed in a work in progress by the Author. See 
C. Cora True-Frost, Civil Society, Freedom of Opinion and Expression, and the 
Conditions Conducive to Terrorism (Nov. 8, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on 
file with author).
62. See G.A. Res. 60/288, supra note 8.
63. Of the sixteen existing international legal conventions/declarations 
pertaining to terrorism, the General Assembly is responsible for six: International 
Protected Persons Convention 1973; Hostages Convention 1979; Terrorist Bombing 
Convention 1997 (entered into force May 2001); Terrorist Financing Convention; 
Nuclear Terrorism Convention; and Comprehensive Convention on International 
Terrorism. 
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Since 2001, the UN has had a central role in coordinating 
counterterrorism responses.64 Over the past decade and a half, the 
UN Security Council, often supported by the Secretariat,65 has led the 
development of a significant and expansive security architecture 
within the UN, at the transnational level, and at the national level.66
In 2001, just over two weeks after the 9/11 attacks, the Security 
Council unanimously established the Counter-Terrorism Committee 
(CTC) through resolution 1373.67 The United States pressed the 
resolution,68 which broadened how the Security Council interprets its 
64. See Scheppele, supra note 18, at 439. See generally G.A. Res. 60/288, 
supra note 8 (calling on member states to adopt international cooperation); James 
Cockayne, Challenges in United Nations Counterterrorism Coordination, in 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TERRORISM 666, 667 (Ben Saul 
ed., 2014).
65. “The Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security 
Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of 
international peace and security.” U.N. Charter art. 99. “In the performance of their 
duties the Secretary-General and the staff shall not seek or receive instructions from 
any government or from any other authority external to the Organization.” Id. at art. 
100. The Secretary-General of the U.N. is appointed by the General Assembly on 
the recommendation of the Security Council, and there is no established procedure 
for removing the Secretary-General. Compare Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court art. 46(2), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, with U.N. Charter art. 
97.
66. See United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism, UNITED NATIONS,
http://www.un.org/en/counterterrorism/overview.shtml [https://perma.cc/3LVM-
B7XB] (last visited Jan. 8, 2018). This security architecture includes: the UN 
Counter-terrorism Centre; UN Counterterrorism Committee (CTC); UN Counter-
Terrorism Implementation Task Force (UN CTITF); the Terrorism Prevention 
Branch of the UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC); UN Counterterrorism 
Center (UNCCT); Counterterrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED); 
Global Counterterrorism Task Forum (GCTF); INTERPOL; and Financial Action 
Task Force of Group of 7, initially set up in 1989. Id. For examination of the 
challenges of coordination of these entities, see Cockayne, supra note 64, at 666 
(describing the difficulties in cooperation within the UN as in part a “normative” 
struggle over what “counter-terrorism” should mean in international society).
67. S.C. Res. 1373, ¶ 6 (Sept. 28, 2001). The Chapter VII resolution 
establishes the CTC, a committee of the whole, with all fifteen sitting council 
members monitoring States’ implementation of the resolution. Id. See also C.S.R. 
Murthy, The U.N. Counter-Terrorism Committee: An Institutional Analysis,
FRIEDRICH EBERT STIFTUNG (Sept. 2007), http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/04876.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5JTD-YJ9R].
68. José E. Alvarez, The Security Council’s War on Terrorism: Problems 
and Policy Options, in REVIEW OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL BY MEMBER STATES 119, 
119; Stefan Talmon, The Security Council as World Legislature, 99 AM. J. INT’L L.
175, 187 (2005). For example, the Council created the 1267 list that allowed for 
freezing of individual assets and travel.
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international peace and security mandates in ways previously 
unimaginable.69 Not all General Assembly States supported the 
precise contours of the now international, Security Council-led “war 
against terror.”70 In particular, Non-aligned Movement States in the 
General Assembly, in particular, noted other global concerns, 
including many that were later labeled as “conditions conducive to 
the spread of terrorism.”71
In 2004, the Security Council established the Counterterrorism 
Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) to further assist the work 
of its CTC and to strengthen States’ capacity to combat terrorism.72
In 2005, partly responding to concerns about the Security Council’s 
actions, the forty-seven-Member-State-strong UN Human Rights 
Council created a Special Rapporteur on the promotion and 
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while 
countering terrorism, which issues reports on various state practices, 
including CVE programs.73 CTED assesses States’ compliance with 
Resolution 1373.74
Despite—or perhaps because of—many States’ resistance to 
UN Security Council-led counter-terrorism initiatives from 2005 to 
2006, the General Assembly75 negotiated and adopted the United 
Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.76 This strategy is 
composed of four pillars of action: The first, and central to this 
analysis, is “to address the conditions conducive to the spread of 
69. See José E. Alvarez, Hegemonic International Law Revisited, 97 AM. J.
INT’L L. 873 (2003); Paul C. Szasz, The Security Council Starts Legislating, 96 AM.
J. INT’L L. 901, 901-04 (2002).
70. See Cockayne, supra note 64, at 669.
71. G.A. Res. 60/288, supra note 8, at 2. 
72. S.C. Res. 1535, ¶ 2 (Mar. 26, 2004).
73. Other related special procedures include a Special Rapporteur on torture 
and execution, established on March 13, 1985 by the Commission on Human Rights. 
G.A. on Status of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment on Its Fortieth Session, U.N. Doc. A/40/128, at 
242 (Dec. 13, 1985); G.A. Res. 1985/33, ¶ 1 (Mar. 13, 1985); Special Rapporteur, 
Human Rights Council, Rep. on Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/31/57, at 3 (Jan. 5, 2016). 
74. S.C. Res. 1535, supra note 72, ¶ 2.
75. The General Assembly enjoys universal membership and a broad 
mandate, but lacks the power to bind under the UN Charter. U.N. Charter art. 10. 
Article 13(1) provides that “[t]he General Assembly shall initiate studies and make 
recommendations for the purpose of: (a) promoting international co-operation in the 
political field.” Id. at art. 13, ¶ 1. In 1947, the General Assembly established the 
International Law Commission, ILC, comprised of thirty-four members elected by 
GA for five-year terms.
76. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
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terrorism”; the second is to “prevent and combat terrorism”; the third
is to “build States’ capacity to prevent and combat terrorism and to 
strengthen the role of the UN System in this regard”; and the fourth 
pillar focuses on “ensur[ing] respect for human rights for all and the 
rule of law as the fundamental basis of the fight against terrorism.”77
B. The Ascendancy of Preventive “CVE” Approaches 
From 2009 to 2013, UN counterterrorism efforts continued, 
with an increasing focus on prevention.78 In 2014, the UN Security 
Council made CVE a legal obligation for States. Daunted by the 
continued, scattered terrorist attacks in Europe and the United States, 
and perhaps encouraged by broad State compliance with its 1373-
regime, the Security Council directed states to address “the 
77. G.A. Res. 60/288, supra note 8, at 4-9. In 2005, the UN Secretary-
General established the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF), 
which includes thirty-one UN entities, to coordinate implementation of the General 
Assembly’s Strategy. U.N. Charter art. 10, 13, ¶ 1. The CTITF’s human rights 
working group produced two reference guides for Member States: one on stopping 
and searching persons and one on security infrastructure. See UNITED NATIONS 
OFFICE OF HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS REFERENCE 
GUIDE: THE STOPPING AND SEARCHING OF PERSONS 1 (2d ed. 2014). In 2005, the UN 
Secretary-General created the oft-overlooked, yet salient, UN Alliance of 
Civilizations to address the roots of polarization between civilizations and 
recommend action. This high-level group of experts explores the roots of 
polarization between societies and cultures today and works to recommend a 
practical program of action to address this issue. There are 145 members to the UN 
Alliance of Civilizations. High Representative, UNITED NATIONS ALLIANCE 
CIVILIZATIONS, https://www.unaoc.org/who-we-are/high-representative/ [https://
perma.cc/SF97-SQ9S] (last visited Jan. 8, 2018); History, UNITED NATIONS 
ALLIANCE CIVILIZATIONS, https://www.unaoc.org/who-we-are/history/ [https://
perma.cc/6V7E-V23X] (last visited Jan. 8, 2017); Who We Are, UNITED NATIONS 
ALLIANCE CIVILIZATIONS, https://www.unaoc.org/who-we-are/ [https://
perma.cc/8LRK-SSDF] (last visited Jan. 8, 2018). In December 2009, the General 
Assembly created a CTITF Secretariat. G.A. Res. 64/235 (Jan. 14, 2010). The Office 
failed to effectively convene the CTITF, and eventually the UN Secretariat 
established the UN Centre on Counter-Terrorism (UN CCT) with $10 million from 
the Saudi Arabian government. See Cockayne, supra note 64, at 673. The UN CCT 
would focus on the “prevention” piece of the General Assembly’s Strategy. Id.
CTITF, UN Office on Drugs and Crime, UNCCT and CTED all facilitate technical 
assistance to Member States in implementing the UN Global Counter-Terrorism 
Strategy. See S.C. Res. 2178, supra note 6, at 3.
78. See Cockayne, supra note 64, at 667.
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conditions conducive to . . . terrorism.”79 SC Resolution 2178 
invokes Chapter VII and orders States to embark on a societal 
approach to “countering violent extremism.”80 In the same resolution, 
the Security Council also deems “extremism” to be among these 
“conditions conducive to terrorism.”81
The UN Security Council obligates States to promote CVE 
initiatives, and the network of United Nations organs also actively 
promotes the Council’s CVE agenda, which is, in turn, closely 
related to the “Prevent” prong of the General Assembly’s Global 
Counterterrorism Strategy.82 In General Assembly Resolution 68/127 
(2014), lamenting the many lives that violent extremism (as 
contrasted to terrorism) had claimed, the General Assembly joined 
the call to States to fight violent extremism while respecting human 
rights.83 As elaborated further in Part III below, other state-based 
organs and bodies, as well as the agencies of the UN, are mostly 
following the Security Council and the Secretary-General’s lead, 
79. S.C. Res. 2178, supra note 6, at 2 (“Recognizing also that terrorism will 
not be defeated by military force, law enforcement measures, and intelligence 
operations alone, and underlining the need to address the conditions conducive to 
the spread of terrorism.”).
80. Id.
81. Id. ¶ 16 (“Encourages Member States to engage relevant local 
communities and non-governmental actors in developing strategies to counter the 
violent extremist narrative that can incite terrorist acts, address the conditions 
conducive to the spread of violent extremism, which can be conducive to terrorism,
including by empowering youth, families, women, religious, cultural and education 
leaders, and all other concerned groups of civil society and adopt tailored 
approaches to countering recruitment to this kind of violent extremism and 
promoting social inclusion and cohesion.”) (emphasis added). The Council makes 
this stipulation although empirical studies are inconclusive about what characterizes 
the path to extremism. The Council apparently found that although the origins of 
extremism are unclear, the relationship between an undefined “violent extremis[m]” 
and terrorism is clear. See, e.g., FAIZA PATEL, RETHINKING RADICALIZATION 8
(Brennan Ctr. for Justice ed., 2011). The Resolution also 
Calls upon all Member States, in accordance with their obligations 
under international law, to cooperate in efforts to address the threat 
posed by foreign terrorist fighters, including by preventing the 
radicalization to terrorism and recruitment of foreign terrorist fighters 
. . . and developing and implementing prosecution, rehabilitation and 
reintegration strategies for returning foreign terrorist fighters.
S.C. Res. 2178, supra note 6, ¶ 4 (emphasis added); see also id. ¶¶ 15-19.
81. CTITF, Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, U.N. PRESS 
RELEASE, https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/ctitf/en/plan-action-prevent-violent-
extremism [https://perma.cc/LK2E-62GD] (last visited Jan. 8, 2018).
83. G.A. Res. 68/127, ¶¶ 4, 10 (Feb. 20, 2014).
What Happens to Human Rights? 827
including the Human Rights Council.84 In 2015, the Secretary-
General and the High Representative for the Alliance of Civilizations 
were very active in promoting CVE approaches before the Secretary-
General’s Action Plan was published.85
According to the Secretary-General, “The spread of violent 
extremism makes preventive efforts all the more relevant.”86 The 
Secretary-General’s Plan of Action attempts to “reinvigorat[e] the 
universal core values of the international community, based on the 
Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, and to present concrete proposals on how the United 
Nations system and Member States [can] best approach the challenge 
of violent extremism leading to terrorism.”87
While the UN is considered the “primary catalyst” for 
multilateral action on CVE,88 there are many other multilateral and 
private groups and fora also pursuing these programs. Frustrated by 
the difficulties of UN negotiations, a number of multi-state entities 
and private organizations have formed to generate and promote 
counterterrorism and CVE programs.89 To name just one, the Global 
Counterterrorism Forum90 supports and catalyzes implementation of 
84. See infra Part III; see also Human Rights Council Res. 30/15, U.N. Doc 
A/HRC/RES/30/15, at 3 (Oct. 12, 2015).
85. For example, it convened a high-level thematic debate with religious 
leaders to promote mutual understanding. Member States and Faith Leaders Gather 
at a High-Level Thematic Debate to Discuss “Promoting Tolerance and 
Reconciliation, Fostering Peaceful, Inclusive Societies and Countering Violent 
Extremism” on 21-22 April, 2015, UNAOC (Apr. 16, 2015),
https://www.unaoc.org/2015/04/member-states-and-faith-leaders-gather-at-a-high-
level-thematic-debate-to-discuss-promoting-tolerance-and-reconciliation-fostering-
peaceful-inclusive-societies-and-countering-violent-extrem/ [https://perma.cc/
B4VY-Y35N].
86. Secretary-General Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, supra
note 7, ¶ 6.
87. Rep. of the Office of the United Nations High Comm’r, Panel 
Discussion on the Effects of Terrorism on the Enjoyment by All Persons of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, ¶ 18, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/30/64 (Sept. 15, 2015).
88. Naz Modirzadeh, If It’s Broke, Don’t Make It Worse: A Critique of the 
U.N. Secretary-General’s Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, LAWFARE
(Jan. 23, 2015), https://www.lawfareblog.com/if-its-broke-dont-make-it-worse-
critique-un-secretary-generals-plan-action-prevent-violent-extremism [https://
perma.cc/5VZY-WMKL].
89. See generally Background and Mission, GLOBAL COUNTERTERRORISM 
F., https://www.thegctf.org/About-us/Background-and-Mission [https://perma.cc/
T2J6-JSF5] (last visited Jan. 8, 2018).
90. The Global Counter-Terrorism Forum was launched on September 22, 
2011. See Background and Mission, supra note 89. The thirty founding members 
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the General Assembly’s Global Counterterrorism Strategy.91 It also 
seeks to promote synergy with other multilateral and private 
coalitions like the Global Community Engagement and Resilience 
Fund.92 In addition, many States have hosted multilateral summits on 
CVE, including The White House Summit on Countering Violent 
Extremism and The Leaders’ Summit to Counter ISIL and Violent 
Extremism.93
C. Evaluating CVE Programs 
Even as the Secretary-General calls on Member States to 
develop national action plans to implement comprehensive programs 
to counter violent extremism,94 however, scholars and human rights 
organizations in various Member States have raised significant 
include (but are not limited to) the permanent members of the Security Council as 
well as Canada, Australia, Germany, Japan, the European Union, and a handful of 
nations in the Middle East. Members and Partners, GLOBAL COUNTERTERRORISM F.,
https://www.thegctf.org/About-us/Members-and-partners [https://perma.cc/H8EX-
AT45] (last visited Jan. 8, 2018).
91. S.C. Res. 2178 mentions the GCTF and its set of good practices. See
S.C. Res. 2178, supra note 6, at 3. The Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy was 
reviewed in June 2016. U.N. Secretary-General, Activities of the United Nations 
System in Implementing the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy,
U.N. Doc. A/70/826 (Apr. 12, 2016).
92. Partners and Outreach, GLOBAL COUNTERTERRORISM F.,
https://www.thegctf.org/About-us/Partners-and-Outreach [https://perma.cc/VJQ2-
HT6S] (last visited Jan. 8, 2018). Other partners include Hedeyah and the 
International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law (IIJ). See Background and 
Mission, supra note 89.
93. See Human Rights Council on Human Rights and Preventing and 
Countering Violent Extremism, 30/3, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/30/L.25/Rev.1, at 2 (Oct. 1, 
2015) [hereinafter Human Rights and Preventing and Countering Violent 
Extremism]; FACT SHEET: Leaders’ Summit to Counter ISIL and Violent 
Extremism (Sept. 29, 2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-
office/2015/09/29/fact-sheet-leaders-summit-counter-isil-and-violent-extremism 
[https://perma.cc/T58J-CND2]; FACT SHEET: The White House Summit on 
Countering Violent Extremism (Feb. 18, 2015), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/18/fact-sheet-white-
house-summit-countering-violent-extremism [https://perma.cc/M9GX-K2SJ]. Saudi 
Arabia and the U.S. have been major financial sponsors of CVE at both multilateral 
and international levels. See, e.g., Contributions, U.N. COUNTER-TERRORISM CTR.,
https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/ctitf/en/uncct/contributions [https://perma.cc/
3ALS-7E6X] (last visited Jan. 8, 2018) (“[T]he Kingdom of Saudi Arabia donated 
an additional USD 100 million to help finance the work of the UNCCT.”).
94. See infra Part III.
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concerns about CVE approaches.95 Policy analysts predict, and other 
evidence indicates, that these CVE programs will continue to grow in 
the future, although they are expensive and their effectiveness is still 
inconclusive.96
One empirical and foundational issue with CVE programs is 
that social scientists and policy analysts still debate what the 
conditions conducive to terrorism actually are. The impacts of CVE 
programs on individual rights at the national level have been hotly 
debated in many States.97 The empirical bases for these programs 
remain elusive. How exactly does “good governance” prevent 
“radicalization”?98 What relative role, if any, do lack of development, 
Islamist ideology, lack of economic opportunity, or social alienation 
play in “extremism” is, at best, still unclear.99 At the national and 
international levels, other complaints center around the lack of 
clarity between and among agencies about what the exact goals of 
CVE are, as well as which of their programs qualify as CVE.100
Related, and at a more applied level, some scholars and policy 
analysts argue that we do not understand what risk factors increase 
an individual’s likelihood of ascribing to violent extremist 
ideologies.101 For example, USAID’s 2011 policy on “The 
Development Response to Violent Extremism,” divided factors into 
“push” and “pull” factors.102 Push factors describe those institutional 
95. See DOES CVE WORK, supra note 2, at 39 (describing inevitable uptick 
of CVE plans). 
96. DIDIER BIGO ET AL., PREVENTING AND COUNTERING YOUTH 
RADICALISATION IN THE EU, 32 (2014) (“Empirical studies show that broadening the 
scope of ‘soft’ counter-radicalisation measures to what is considered traditionally 
community cohesion work . . . is detrimental to both objectives of countering 
radicalization and fostering community cohesion.”). It is beyond the scope of this 
Article to provide a detailed analysis of the effectiveness of existing CVE programs. 
At any rate, the literature is not especially robust. See, e.g., DOES CVE WORK, supra
note 2; Laurie Goodstein, F.B.I. Tool to Identify Extremists Is Criticized, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 1, 2015), www.nytimes.com/2015/11/02/us/fbi-tool-to-identify-extremists-is-
criticized.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/9XKZ-C4R9].
97. Secretary-General Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, supra 
note 7, ¶¶ 24-29.
98. See Modirzadeh, supra note 88.
99. See generally Faiza Patel & Meghan Koushik, Countering Violent 
Extremism, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (2017), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/
default/files/publications/Brennan%20Center%20CVE%20Report_0.pdf [https://
perma.cc/UA59-LVS8].
100. See, e.g., DOES CVE WORK, supra note 2, at 32 (discussing confusion 
about what counts as a CVE program during an audit of USAID services).
101. See generally Patel & Koushik, supra note 99.
102. See Schomerus & Taraboulsi-McCarthy, supra note 43, at 9.
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or societal failures—real or perceived—that lead individuals to 
become vulnerable to violent extremism.103 Pull factors are said to 
explain how violent extremists are able to attract new adherents, but 
the distinction between these two categories is not particularly 
clear.104
More fundamentally, and as elaborated further in Part III 
below, over the last ten years, CVE programs have sparked concerns 
about their impact on interactions between governments and civil 
society105 and the scale of these programs, as well as the backlash 
they have created. For example, one concern is that vulnerable 
minorities will be disincentivized from accessing necessary social 
services with mandated or even suggested reporting, like those 
created by some CVE programs like the UK’s Prevent.106
Numerous scholars have remarked on a central concern raised 
by the UN Security Council’s Resolution 1373-inspired 
counterterrorism initiatives: the absence of a precise definition of 
terrorism.107 As elaborated further below, the same concern is present 
in the case of the UN’s endorsement of programs countering violent 
extremism: Violent extremism is not defined.108 Regardless of the 
many criticisms and questionable efficacy of these programs,109
policy analysts and politicians believe that such programs will 
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. This is the subject of a work in progress by the Author. See C. Cora 
True-Frost, Civil Society, Freedom of Opinion and Expression, and the Conditions 
Conducive to Terrorism (Nov. 8, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
author).
106. Letter from ACLU et al., to The Honorable Lisa O. Monaco, Assistant 
to the President for Homeland Sec. & Deputy Nat’l Sec. Adviser (Dec. 18, 2017), 
https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/141218_cve_coalition_letter_2.pdf [https://
perma.cc/BS8A-ZFJF]; Countering Violent Extremism: Myths and Fact, BRENNAN 
CTR. FOR JUST., https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/analysis/102915%
20Final%20CVE%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/K8WL-VGGV] (last 
visited Jan. 8, 2018). See, e.g., THE PREVENT DUTY, supra note 10.
107. See, e.g., Ben Saul, Civilizing the Exception: Universally Defining 
Terrorism, in POST 9/11 AND THE STATE OF PERMANENT LEGAL EMERGENCY:
SECURITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN COUNTERING TERRORISM 85 (Aniceto Masferrer 
ed., 2012); Walker, supra note 2, at 134.
108. See generally Owen Frazer & Christian Nünlist, The Concept of 
Countering Violent Extremism, in 183 CTR. FOR SECURITY STUD. (CSS), ETH
ZURICH 1, 2 (Christian Nünlist ed., Dec. 2015).
109. Joint Written Statement by NGOs on Human Rights Concerns of CVE 
Initiatives to the Dep’t of Justice (Feb. 4, 2016) (on file with author). 
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continue to grow and are on the “uptick” at the local, regional, 
national, international levels.110
II. CVE PROGRAMS THROUGH THE LENS OF INTERNATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
“The founders of the United Nations believed in the power of 
our shared principles, purposes and values. Member States are 
obliged to adapt their actions to new realities without reneging on 
our common commitments.”111
Both the Secretary-General’s Plan of Action and Security 
Council Resolution 2178 generally direct States to undertake CVE 
programs with respect for fundamental human rights.112 For example, 
the Plan of Action on CVE, “recognize[s] that the protection of 
human rights is crucial to achieving the goal of effectively 
preventing and countering violent extremism.”113 Taken at face 
value, it might appear, then, that CVE and human rights are easy 
companions, perhaps even in a symbiotic relationship with each 
other. Indeed, the UN views promoting human rights as a 
preventative mechanism against violent extremism: “While there can 
be no excuse or justification for violent extremism, abuses and 
violations of human rights may contribute to creating an environment 
in which people, especially youth, are vulnerable to radicalization 
that leads to violent extremism and recruitment by violent extremists 
and terrorists.”114
But closer inspection belies such an easy inference. Just a 
month after the launch of the Plan of Action, the High Commissioner 
for Human Rights said the central challenge for human rights in 2016 
was for States to remain committed to advancing human rights, even 
110. See, e.g., Dep’t of State & USAID, Joint Strategy on Countering 
Violent Extremism, USAID, 5 (May 2016), http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/
PBAAE503.pdf [https://perma.cc/ET3Z-6RJN] [hereinafter Joint Strategy on CVE]; 
see also Secretary-General Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, supra note 
7.
111. Secretary-General Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, supra 
note 7, ¶ 11. 
112. See id. ¶ 57; S.C. Res. 2178, supra note 6, ¶ 11.
113. Human Rights and Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism, 
supra note 93, at 2 (“States’ international obligations to promote and protect human 
rights while preventing and countering violent extremism.”).
114. Id.
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as they work to promote security.115 By 2017, the global human 
rights situation had declined so precipitously that the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights opened the Human Rights Council 
session in February 2017, lamenting the deeply concerning trend 
towards disregard by States for human rights.116
As a practical matter, embracing preventive CVE programs, 
even with many caveats about respecting human rights, empowers 
States to intervene early and often in individuals’ lives, in many fora, 
and often under rather murky terms. International human rights law, 
which constrains the use of State power at the domestic level, thus 
offers a valuable lens through which to view the UN’s position on 
CVE initiatives. Throughout the analysis, however, traditional 
“hard” counterterrorism programs serve as a foil—are preventive 
CVE programs better or worse for security and rights than are 
traditional counterterrorism methods? 
This Part examines some positive and negative impacts of CVE 
prevention efforts on internationally protected human rights. It first 
outlines the general contours of the specific human rights and raises 
questions to shape future critical examination of the effects of CVE 
115. ‘The Moment We Do Not Support the Human Rights Agenda We See It 
Rolling Back in Many Parts of the World’ – Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, UN NEWS CTR.
(Jan. 18, 2016), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=
53035#.WfoJPHfMxo4 [https://perma.cc/C4BL-LZ9P].
116. Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, Opening 
ceremony of the 34th session of the Human Rights Council in Geneva, (Feb. 27, 
2017), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=
21229&LangID=E [https://perma.cc/U2AK-KFR6]. On March 8, 2017, the High 
Commissioner said:
This past year has witnessed considerable bloodshed at the hands of 
extremist and terrorist groups, and I take this opportunity to once again 
strongly condemn all such violence, in every instance. . . . 2017 may be a 
pivotal year in many respects. Will the vicious attacks by terrorist groups 
thrust governments deeper into security-heavy responses, further 
heightening the likelihood of abuses, at the expense of human rights? And 
will the populists continue to reap the rewards of stoked-up fear and 
disillusionment? Together with other authoritarian-minded leaders, will 
they tip the international system over the edge? Or will there be enough 
people who realise clearly and deeply what is at stake – who see the entire 
rights-based system is under attack – and reverse the centrifugal forces 
which threaten to break apart international and regional institutions?
High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Activities of His Office and Recent 
Human Rights Developments: Annual Report and Oral Update to the 34th Session of 
the Human Rights Council, UNITED NATIONS HUM. RTS. (Mar. 8, 2017), 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=21316&
LangID=E [https://perma.cc/TB8T-SKYD].
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policies.117 CVE prevention programs implicate specific civil and 
political rights, including: the right to life;118 the right to due process; 
privacy; freedom of opinion, belief and thought;119 freedom of 
expression;120 freedom of association; the principle of non-
discrimination;121 and even freedom of movement. CVE may also 
implicate economic and social rights, including the right to 
education122 and the right to medical care, for example.123 This is true 
although States’ interpretation of international-level rights vary 
widely at the national level.
A. The Legal Framework
During times of national emergency, some international rights 
are subject to limitation or derogation.124 For example, Article 4 of 
the ICCPR sets forth a two-prong test for derogation of some rights 
during (1) “time[s] of public emergency” (2) “threaten[ing] the life 
of the nation.”125 There is very little international-level case law126 on 
117. It is beyond the scope of this Article to conduct a comprehensive 
analysis on the effects of these programs on human rights at the national level, but 
further study is recommended. Officially, the UN takes the position that “[a]ll 
human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated.” Vienna 
Declaration and Programme of Action, UNITED NATIONS HUM. RTS. (June 25, 
1993), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/Vienna.aspx [https://
perma.cc/H343-5LHJ].
118. See ICCPR, supra note 32, art. 6.
119. See id. at art. 18.
120. See id. at art. 17-19, 25, 27; General Comment No. 34, supra note 52.
121. See U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 18, U.N. Doc. 
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1, at 26 (1994).
122. ICESCR, supra note 32, at art. 13.
123. Id. at art. 12. The other right under the ICESCR that may be implicated 
would be “the widest possible protection” of the family, particularly for “[the 
family’s] establishment and while it is responsible for the care and education of 
dependent children.” Id. at art. 10.
124. Neither Just nor Effective, HUM. RTS. WATCH (June 24, 2004), 
https://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/eca/uk/anti-terrorism.pdf [https://
perma.cc/M8NL-CFKY]. Very few States have officially derogated from their 
human rights obligations under international treaties after 9/11. Id. The United 
Kingdom, however, derogated from the European Convention on Human Rights and 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in late 2001. Id.
125. ICCPR, supra note 32, at 174.
126. See Landinelli Silva v. Uruguay, Communication No. 34/1978, U.N. 
Doc CCPR/C/OP/1, at 65 (1984). Other influential sources regarding the 
preconditions for derogation are in accord. See e.g., Richard B. Lillich, Paris 
Minimum Standards of Human Rights Norms in a State of Emergency, 79 AM. J.
INT’L L. 1072 (Oct. 1985); Economic and Social Council, annex, Siracusa Principles 
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the question of how this two-part test can be fulfilled, but the Human 
Rights Committee of the ICCPR has elaborated on the test by stating 
that derogations must be “exceptional,” “temporary,” and limited to 
the extent “strictly required by the exigencies of the situation.”127 As 
Christopher Michaelson notes, given States’ rhetoric about how 9/11 
fundamentally altered the world, it is a bit surprising to learn that 
remarkably few States have formally derogated from their 
obligations under the ICCPR.128
Since 2001, only one European State officially derogated from 
its obligations under Article 4, and one other State did so 
internationally, but for reasons other than terrorism.129 The UN 
Human Rights Committee has flagged the negative impacts that the 
United Kingdom’s derogation may have on ICCPR-guaranteed 
rights.130 Overall, however, even with the continued incidence of 
terrorism, the human rights obligations of the majority of States 
under the ICCPR persist, subject to any applicable limitations and 
reservations.131
Absent a definition of violent extremism, the UN Secretary 
General’s Plan of Action claims to pursue a “practical” approach to 
preventing violent extremism.132 Yet, the ICCPR Human Rights 
Committee has raised concerns relating to various aspects of national 
CVE programs, and these are effectively the only practical models of 
preventive CVE programs that exist.133 As described further below in 
on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1985/4 (1985).
127. General Comment No. 34, supra note 52.
128. See Christopher Michaelson, International Human Rights on Trial - The 
United Kingdom’s and Australia’s Legal Response to 9/11, 25 SYDNEY L. REV. 275, 
293 (2003).
129. HELEN DUFFY, THE ‘WAR ON TERROR’ AND THE FRAMEWORK OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 583 (2d ed. 2015).
130. Neither Just nor Effective, supra note 124. The other State that has 
officially derogated is Nepal, which derogated in 2005 but revoked their derogation 
on the same day. ICCPR, Nepal: Notification under Article 4 (3), C.N.271.2005 
Treaties-5 (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter Nepal: Notification under Article 4 (3)].
131. Nepal: Notification under Article 4 (3), supra note 130.
132. See Secretary-General Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, 
supra note 7, ¶ 5.
133. See, e.g., Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations of the 
Human Rights Committee: Honduras, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/HND/CO/1 (Dec. 13, 
2006) [hereinafter Observations of the HRC: Honduras]; Human Rights Comm., 
Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Mauritius, ¶¶ 5-6, U.N. 
Doc. CCPR/CO/83/MUS (Apr. 27, 2005) [hereinafter Observations of the HRC: 
Mauritius]; Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations of the Human Rights 
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Part IV, in late February 2016, Ben Emmerson, the Special 
Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights while 
countering terrorism, released a report responding to and criticizing 
various aspects of preventive CVE programs and the UN’s new 
focus on them.134
According to the text of the ICCPR, non-derogable rights 
include the right to life,135 the principle of legality,136 and the right to 
freedom of thought and belief.137 According to the authoritative body 
charged with its interpretation, the Human Rights Committee, the 
right to freely hold opinions is one from which States may not 
reserve out of or derogate from.138
According to General Comment 3 of the Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, States are “bound by a 
minimum core obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very 
least, minimum essential levels of each of the rights” provided in the 
ICESCR, including: minimum essential food, which is sufficient, 
nutritionally adequate, and safe to ensure freedom from hunger; 
“essential primary health care,” including essential drugs under the 
World Health Organization’s Action Programme on Essential Drugs; 
and essential “basic shelter and housing.”139 In addition, States must 
guarantee non-discrimination in the exercise of each of the 
economic, social, and cultural rights enshrined in the Covenant.140
Committee: Russian Federation, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/RUS/CO/6 (Nov. 24, 
2009) [hereinafter Observations of the HRC: Russian Federation].
134. Special Rapporteur A/HRC/31/65, supra note 23, ¶¶ 54-55.
135. ICCPR, supra note 32, at art. 6. Pursuant to Article 4 of the ICCPR, 
additional non-derogable rights include, for example, Articles 7 (free from torture or 
cruel punishment), 8 (slavery), 11 (no imprisonment for contractual obligation), and 
16 (right to recognition). Id. at arts. 7-8, 11, 16. Even in a “time of public emergency 
which threatens the life of the nation and the existence of which is officially 
proclaimed,” these rights are non-derogable. Id. at art. 4(2). In addition, the Human 
Rights Committee has determined in its General Comments that additional rights 
should be viewed as non-derogable. General Comment No. 34, supra note 52, ¶ 5.
136. See ICCPR, supra note 32, at art. 15.
137. See id. at art. 18. 
138. See General Comment No. 34, supra note 52.
139. U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 
14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/2000/4 (Aug. 11, 2000); U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights,
General Comment No. 12: The Right to Adequate Food, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/5 
(May 12, 1999); U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, General Comment 
No. 3: The Nature of States Parties’ Obligations, U.N. Doc. E/1991/23 (Dec. 14, 
1990).
140. U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 
20: Non-Discrimination in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, U.N. Doc. 
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States may also enter reservations about some, but not all, 
rights.141 For example, the United States’ reservation to Article 20 of 
the ICCPR stipulates that its international obligations cannot violate 
the U.S. Constitution.142
B. Right to Life
Under international human rights law, States have a non-
derogable duty to protect human life.143 Tunisian activist Amira 
Yahyaoui describes the duty:
[F]or human rights activists, security is a taboo. Security means you are 
anti-human rights. But that gives space to those who are not very keen on 
human rights to take care of this topic. I think that people from a human 
rights background should be more involved in security issues, and stop 
thinking that security is a taboo. If we want to defend people’s rights, the 
first thing we need to defend is their right to live and not to die. That’s the 
first step.144
Consistent with this activist’s description, CVE programs 
emphasize States’ duty to ensure a secure society and to protect life, 
focusing on territorial boundaries.145 Balancing competing rights 
against each other is a persistent concern in human rights law.146
ICCPR Article 5(1) establishes that “nothing in [the present 
Covenant] may be interpreted as implying [a] right to engage in any 
activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the 
rights and freedoms recognized herein or at their limitation to a 
E/C.12/GC/20 (July 2, 2009); U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights,
General Comment No. 16: Article 3: The Equal Right of Men and Women to the 
Enjoyment of All Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2005/3 
(May 13, 2005). 
141. For example, reservations that defeat the object and the purpose of the 
ICCPR are not permitted. U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 24: 
General Comment on Issues Relating to Reservations Made Upon Ratification or 
Accession to the Covenant or the Optional Protocols Thereto, or in Relation to 
Declarations Under Article 41 of the Covenant, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6
(Nov. 11, 1994).
142. See 138 CONG. REC. S4781-01 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992). 
143. G.A. Res. 217 A (III), Universal Declaration of Human Rights, at art. 3 
(Dec. 10, 1948); ICCPR, supra note 32, at art. 6; ICESCR, supra note 32, pmbl. 
144. Ilya Lozovsky, A Wake-Up Call for NGOs, FOREIGN POL’Y (June 5, 
2015, 5:51 PM), http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/06/05/a-wake-up-call-for-ngos-
tunisia-arab-spring-oslo-freedom-forum/ [https://perma.cc/Y5LE-5U8X].
145. See id. 
146. See Schomerus & Taraboulsi-McCarthy, supra note 43, at 4, 7-8.
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greater extent than is provided for in the present Covenant.”147 So, 
the State may not use a duty created by the Covenant to justify 
eliminating or destroying other rights. 
In CVE programs, the State’s duty to protect life is pitted 
against the State’s duty to promote individual freedoms, inter alia,
the right to be free of discrimination and privacy rights.148 One of the 
core goals of CVE programs, preventing radicalization, creates 
opportunities for intervention before individuals’ actions or planning 
would trigger a criminal process.149 In these programs, States 
leverage their duty to protect life to intervene, often with the 
cooperation of civil society, in individuals’ lives much earlier than in 
traditional anti-terrorism programs, and concerns arise in this 
process.150
C. Criminal Law: Incitement
In Resolution 2178 (2014), when the UN Security Council 
called upon Member States to take steps to ensure that incitement to 
commit terrorist acts does not occur,151 it failed to define what 
constitutes incitement. Not coincidentally, the Special Rapporteur 
has raised concerns about the breadth and vagueness of States’ 
prohibitions of incitement.152 States have an obligation to ensure that 
freedom of expression is exercised responsibly under the ICCPR.153
National, religious, and racial incitement to hatred that constitutes 
discrimination, hostility, or violence may be, and in some cases must 
be, limited by the State.154 In 2011, the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights and the High Representative of the 
147. ICCPR, supra note 32, at art. 5.
148. See id.
149. See Schomerus & Taraboulsi-McCarthy, supra note 43, at 18.
150. See id.
151. See S.C. Res. 2178, supra note 6, ¶ 11, 14, 16-17.
152. Special Rapporteur A/HRC/31/65, supra note 23, ¶ 21.
153. The ICCPR Articles 19 and 20(2) are part of a clear normative 
framework created by international law for when States must limit or when they 
may permissibly limit hate speech, and they are helped by Human Rights Committee 
General Comment No. 34 and the Rabat Plan of Action. UN HRC: Initiative to 
Criminalise “Acts of a Racist and Xenophobic Nature” Must Adhere to Freedom of 
Expression Standards, ARTICLE 19 (Mar. 21, 2017), https://www.article19.org/
resources.php/resource/38681/en/un-hrc:-initiative-to-criminalise [https://perma.cc/
34JD-BZXS].
154. See ICCPR, supra note 32, at art. 20(2) (“Any advocacy of national, 
racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or 
violence shall be prohibited by law.”).
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UN Secretary-General for the Alliance of Civilizations convened a 
series of expert workshops on the issue of incitement, resulting in the 
Rabat Plan of Action on the prohibition of national, racial, or 
religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, 
hostility, or violence.155 However, the Rabat Plan of Action goes 
beyond expressing concern that “perpetrators of incidents which 
reach[ed] the threshold of art. 20 of the ICCPR [were] not prosecuted 
and punished.”156 It also found that minorities are “de facto 
persecuted, with a chilling effect on others” and 
the dichotomy of (1) no prosecution of “real” incitement cases and (2) 
persecution of minorities under the guise of domestic incitement laws 
[which] seems to be pervasive. Anti-incitement laws in countries [across 
the world] can be qualified as heterogeneous, at times excessively narrow 
or vague[;] jurisprudence on incitement to hatred has been scarce and ad 
hoc[;] and while several States have adopted related policies, most of them 
too general, not systematically followed up, lacking focus and deprived of 
proper impact-assessments.157
D. CVE as an Alternative to Criminal Punishment or Imprisonment
Individuals have fundamental rights to be free from degrading 
treatment under human rights law.158 As applied to individuals 
convicted under the many anti-terrorism laws, CVE programs may 
offer alternatives to prosecution, harsh sentences, or deportation.159
Some commentators have noted that CVE programs provide 
allegedly would-be terrorists with alternatives to arrest and 
detention.160 For example, in January 2017, a federal judge in 
Minneapolis, chagrined by the number of young defendants 
155. Rep. of the United Nations High Comm’r for Human Rights, on the 
Expert Workshops on the Prohibition of Incitement to National, Racial or Religious 
Hatred, annex, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/22/17/Add.4 (Jan. 11, 2013) [hereinafter Rep. of 
the United Nations High Comm’r for Human Rights]. The ICCPR Articles 19 and 
20(2) set out framework for when States must limit, or where they may permissibly 
limit, hate speech. See ICCPR, supra note 32, at art. 19, 20(2).
156. Rep. of the United Nations High Comm’r for Human Rights, supra note 
155, ¶ 11.
157. Id.
158. ICCPR, supra note 32, at art. 7.
159. See generally Brendan I. Koerner, Can You Turn a Terrorist Back into a 
Citizen?, WIRED (Jan. 24, 2017), https://www.wired.com/2017/01/can-you-turn-
terrorist-back-into-citizen/ [https://perma.cc/J68M-2CR3] (telling the story of a 
young man who pleaded guilty to aiding the Islamic State under an anti-terrorism 
law and was mandated to participate in a rehabilitative de-radicalization program as 
an alternative to imprisonment). 
160. See id.
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receiving harsh prison sentences for “material support” convictions, 
investigated counter-radicalization programs.161 He then sentenced 
some, but not all, “would-be terrorists” to a de-radicalization 
program instead of to incarceration.162 The criteria for who is eligible 
for these alternate, more rehabilitative, and expensive forms of 
punishment are not clear, nor does the UN offer helpful guidance at 
this level of specificity. CVE de-radicalization programs that offer an 
alternative to harsh prison sentences are arguably better for the 
defendant and for society than is incarceration, which offers few 
rehabilitation opportunities for the beliefs or behavior that may have 
led to the conviction. 
Depending on the particular CVE program in various States, 
however, these programs may just as easily assist the government in 
labeling and identifying suspects, thus raising the possibility 
individuals will be prosecuted or deported.163 In addition, to the 
extent that this alternate sentencing permits or encourages the 
drafting of terrorist-specific criminal laws to be drafted where 
existing criminal laws would suffice, we might be concerned about 
over-criminalization—particularly in the murky middle ground 
between criminal law and civil law that terrorism offenses often 
represent. 
Preventive CVE programs aimed at identifying people at risk 
of “radicalization” may very well enable States to bring new parties 
into the justice system by broadening the scope of behaviors and 
beliefs that are considered to be legitimately of interest to, or 
threatening to, the State. 
E. Preventive CVE—What Exactly Is Violent Extremism Anyway? 
Definitions, Vagueness, and Privacy 
The broad, vague contours of preventive CVE policies inspire 
the most prominent human rights concerns. Human rights law 
161. Id.
162. Id. Mr. Koerner describes the vetting that defendants undergo in order 
to be deemed worthy candidates for a de-radicalization program as an alternative 
sentence. Id.
163. Patel & Koushik, supra note 101, at 2-3 (“Channeling law enforcement 
resources into investigating people based on a potpourri of unproven indicators [is 
not] likely to snare criminals, but rather to draw scrutiny to individuals whose 
speech or beliefs are outside the mainstream.”).
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requires States to respect the individual’s privacy,164 freedom of 
opinion,165 and right to adequate process and to be informed of 
charges against them.166 CVE programs prompt many legality- and 
due process-related questions, including: How will the State notify 
individuals about what conduct renders them suspect under CVE 
programs? Is conduct required, or can mere beliefs fall under CVE 
programs? What beliefs are extremist?167 How exactly is violent 
164. ICCPR, supra note 32, at art. 17(1)-(2) (“1. No one shall be subjected to 
arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, 
nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation. 2. Everyone has the right to the 
protection of the law against such interference or attacks.”).
166. See id. at art. 19(1)-(2) (“1. Everyone shall have the right to hold 
opinions without interference. 2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of 
expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information 
and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in 
the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.”).
166. See id. at art. 14(2)-(3) (“2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence 
shall have the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. 
In the determination of any criminal charge against him, everyone shall be entitled 
to the following minimum guarantees, in full equality: (a) To be informed promptly 
and in detail in a language which he understands of the nature and cause of the 
charge against him; (b) To have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of 
his defence and to communicate with counsel of his own choosing; (c) To be tried 
without undue delay; (d) To be tried in his presence, and to defend himself in person 
or through legal assistance of his own choosing; to be informed, if he does not have 
legal assistance, of this right; and to have legal assistance assigned to him, in any 
case where the interests of justice so require, and without payment by him in any 
such case if he does not have sufficient means to pay for it; (e) To examine, or have 
examined, the witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination 
of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (f) To 
have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the 
language used in court; (g) Not to be compelled to testify against himself or to 
confess guilt.”).
167. See, e.g., Observations of the HRC: Russian Federation, supra note 133,
¶ 24 (“24. In light of numerous reports that the extremism laws are being used to 
target organizations and individuals critical of the Government, the Committee 
regrets that the definition of ‘extremist activity’ in the Federal Law on Combating 
Extremist Activity remains vague, allowing for arbitrariness in its application, and 
that the 2006 amendment to this law has made certain forms of defamation of public 
officials an act of extremism. The Committee also notes with concern that some 
provisions of article 1 of the Federal Law on Combating Extremist Activity include 
acts that are not sanctioned in the Criminal Code and are only punishable under the 
Code of Administrative Offences, such as mass dissemination of extremist materials, 
the application of which may not be subject to judicial review. The Committee is 
also concerned about the loose manner in which the definition of ‘social groups’ in 
article 148 of the Criminal Code has been interpreted by the courts and their reliance 
on various experts in this respect, granting protection for State organs and agents 
against ‘extremism’[] (arts. 9 and 19).”); see also Human Rights Comm., 
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extremism different from terrorism? What effect does being 
identified as “vulnerable to violent extremism” have on individuals’ 
rights? What exactly will the State do with an identified individual? 
What information about the individual does the State collect? What 
information does it provide to the individual? What opportunity do 
individuals have to challenge their classification as being “vulnerable 
to violent extremism”? What reporters will States credit—teachers, 
doctors, social workers, friends, or family?168
Nevertheless, the UN Security Council and the Secretary-
General leave core fundamental questions about CVE unanswered 
even as they endorse CVE programs and policies.169 Neither the 
Security Council nor the Secretary-General offer model definitions 
of violent extremism, for example, instead leaving it to States to 
define the very phenomenon of violent extremism that the UN 
directs States to address.170 The Secretary-General says that 
“[d]efinitions of ‘terrorism’ and ‘violent extremism’ are the 
prerogative of Member States and must be consistent with their 
obligations under international law, in particular international human 
rights law.”171 Similarly, the Human Rights Council, too, adopted 
“violent extremism” without definition.172 And the UN does not offer 
much guidance about what acts or beliefs count as “violent 
extremism.”173 As a result, conceptual confusion continues to cloud 
“violent extremism.”174 Unhelpfully, the Secretary-General stated 
Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Russian Federation, ¶ 
20, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/79/RUS (Dec. 1, 2003).
168. UNITED NATIONS EDUCATION, SCIENCE, & CULTURAL ORGANIZATION, A
TEACHER’S GUIDE ON THE PREVENTION OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM 9 (2016).
170. Special Rapporteur A/HRC/31/65, supra note 23, ¶ 20-22.
170. In Special Rapporteur Emmerson’s 2016 report, he surveys the many 
different conceptions of violent extremism in various countries in Europe and 
Australia alone. Id. ¶ 11-12.
171. Secretary-General Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, supra
note 7, ¶ 5.
172. See, e.g., H.R.C. Res. 30/15, supra 84, at 2 (“Deeply concerned at the 
profound threat posed by acts resulting from violent extremism and terrorism 
motivated by extremist ideologies or intolerance to the realization and enjoyment of 
human rights.”).
173. Id.
174. Patel & Koushik, supra note 101, at 3 (discussing how the UN has 
pushed CVE through its resolutions despite the lack of a clear definition of violent 
extremism which has now caused some UN human rights experts to raise concerns 
about the impact of CVE programs).
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that violent extremism is a “wider” category than terrorism without 
elaboration.175
Empirical studies show that the behavioral and causal trajectory 
toward “radicalization” is clouded with confusion.176
Correspondingly, State’s legal definitions of offenses relating to 
radicalization, which vary greatly, are often open-ended and 
vague.177 According to the Special Rapporteur and Human Rights 
Committee, many states define “extremism” in an overbroad fashion, 
failing to give notice of what conduct runs afoul of policies and 
laws.178 As described in the next Part, related laws now criminalize 
internationally protected activities including peaceful protests, 
critical speech, and freedom of movement and religion.179
A full cycle of CVE policies has been implemented in some 
States,180 as well as in States’ foreign policy and development 
efforts.181 After the first phase of CVE programs, many governments 
learned that they require the cooperation of civil society to be 
175. Secretary-General Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, supra 
note 7, at 13.
176. See Koerner, supra note 159; see also John Horgan & Mary Beth Altier, 
The Future of Terrorist De-Radicalization Programs, 13 GEO. J. INT’L AFF. 83, 85 
(2012).
177. Special Rapporteur A/70/371, supra note 23, ¶ 14 (“[T]he Special 
Rapporteur notes that many of the measures taken or envisaged by States violate the 
principle of legality by containing overly broad and vague definitions of 
terrorism.”); Special Rapporteur A/HRC/31/65, supra note 23, ¶ 12 (discussing 
various European countries’ definitions of violent extremism).
178. See Special Rapporteur A/HRC/31/65, supra note 23, ¶ 11; Human 
Rights Comm., General Comment No. 35, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/35 ¶ 22 (Dec. 16, 
2014) [hereinafter General Comment No. 35] (vagrancy law); Observations of the 
HRC: Honduras, supra note 133, ¶ 13 (“unlawful association”); Observations of the 
HRC: Mauritius, supra note 133, ¶ 12 (terrorism law); Observations of the HRC: 
Russian Federation, supra note 133, ¶ 24 (“extremist activity”).
179. See Letta Tayler, Overreach: How New Global Counterterrorism 
Measures Jeopardize Rights, HUM. RTS. WATCH, https://www.hrw.org/world-
report/2017/country-chapters/global [https://perma.cc/6VS3-TXGW] (last visited 
Jan. 8, 2018).
180. See, e.g., Channel Duty Guidance: Protecting Vulnerable People from 
Being Drawn into Terrorism: Statutory Guidance for Channel Panel Members and 
Partners of Local Panels, HM GOV’T (2015), https://www.gov.uk/government/
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/425189/Channel_Duty_Guidance_Apr
il_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/YLM4-4FHN] (stating Prevent Phase I launched in 
UK in 2007 and Prevent II launched in UK in 2012). 
181. See, e.g., Joint Strategy on CVE, supra note 110, at 2, 4 (presenting the 
example that in the United States, the State Department and USAID were the lead 
agencies on CVE programming). 
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successful.182 Many States’ plans for civil society engagement 
include requiring civil society “partners” to provide the government 
information regarding who they perceive to be “risk for 
radicalization,” often in the absence of training or clarity about who 
these individuals are, as a part of receiving funding from the 
government.183 The United Kingdom reports that there has been over-
reporting, and that most individuals have been cleared.184
F. What of Freedom of Opinion, Expression, and Association?
A prominent human rights-related concern about CVE 
programs is that they offer governments wide latitude to chill speech, 
stigmatize opinions, and discourage certain types of association.185
Human rights law protects freedom of expression, and in General 
Comment 34, the Human Rights Committee declares that no 
reservations are permitted to this fundamental right.186 The right may 
182. See Building Community Resilience, supra note 15 (“The Pilot Program 
is engaged in identifying partners and sources of funding to implement the action 
plan. Terror recruiting in Minnesota is a pressing problem and we must act 
decisively to break the cycle.”).
183. Such programs would fall under the penultimate slot to the right on 
Table 1. See supra Table 1.
184. See, e.g., Josh Halliday, Almost 4,000 People Referred to UK 
Deradicalisation Scheme Last Year, GUARDIAN (Mar. 20, 2016),
https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/mar/20/almost-4000-people-were-
referred-to-uk-deradicalisation-scheme-channel-last-year [https://perma.cc/EA6Y-
YX5N]; Miqdaad Versi, Theh Latest Prevent Figures Show Why the Strategy Needs 
an Independent Review, GUARDIAN (Nov. 10, 2017), 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/nov/10/prevent-strategy-
statistics-independent-review-home-office-muslims [https://perma.cc/XN69-ZFRE];
Referrals over Radicalisation ‘Double in a Year’, BBCNEWS (Feb. 22, 2016), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-35633673 [https://perma.cc/NK3L-2FLJ].
185. See Laurie Goodstein, F.B.I. Tool to Identify Extremists Is Criticized,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/02/us/fbi-tool-to-
identify-extremists-is-criticized.html [https://perma.cc/NQU8-7BF3]; Lauren 
Walker, How the FBI Helps Americans Become ‘Terrorists’, DAILY DOT (June 9, 
2016), http://www.dailydot.com/layer8/fbi-informant-sting-operation-isis-terrorism/ 
[https://perma.cc/2MCD-5WNZ].
186. ICCPR, supra note 32, art. 19 (“1. Everyone shall have the right to hold 
opinions without interference. 2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of 
expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information 
and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in 
the form of art, or through any other media of his choice. 3. The exercise of the 
rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special duties and 
responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall 
only be such as are provided by law and are necessary: (a) For respect of the rights 
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be, and sometimes is, limited by the responsibility to protect 
individuals from hateful speech.187 States’ various free speech 
protections demonstrate the complexities and cultural differences at 
play when balancing States’ need to protect individuals from hateful 
speech against freedom of expression.188 At present, we do not know 
if CVE programs successfully curb “dangerous speech.”189
Human rights law also protects individuals’ rights to hold any 
opinion whatsoever; any effort to limit, coerce, or criminalize the 
holding or not holding of an opinion is prohibited.190 Yet preventive 
CVE programs are designed to deem “radical beliefs” suspect and 
deserving of reprogramming. What constitutes a radical belief? What 
penalty might an individual face for holding radical beliefs? What 
or reputations of others; (b) For the protection of national security or of public order 
(ordre public), or of public health or morals.”); General Comment No. 34, supra
note 52, ¶¶ 2, 6; Yong-Joo Kang v. Republic of Korea, Communication No. 
878/1999, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/78/D/878/1999, ¶¶ 7.1-.2, (July 15, 2003).
187. The ICCPR Articles 19 and 20(2) are part of a clear normative 
framework created by international law for when States must limit, or where they 
may permissibly limit, hate speech, and are helped by Human Rights Committee 
General Comment No.34 and the Rabat Plan of Action. See UN HRC: Initiative to 
Criminalise “Acts of a Racist and Xenophobic Nature” Must Adhere to Freedom of 
Expression Standards, supra note 153. For more work on what constitutes 
dangerous speech, see Susan Benesch, Dangerous Speech: A Proposal to Prevent 
Group Violence, WORLD POL’Y INST. (Jan. 12, 2012), 
http://www.worldpolicy.org/sites/default/files/Dangerous%20Speech%20Guidelines
%20Benesch%20January%202012.pdf [https://perma.cc/4PT8-7T3U].
188. See Christopher F. Schuetze, 20 Are Convicted for Sexist and Racist 
Abuse of Dutch Politician, N.Y. TIMES (May 18, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/18/world/europe/sylvana-simons-netherlands-
hate-speech.html [https://perma.cc/V4K9-USBF].
189. Indeed, the Global Counterterrorism Forum Ankara Document of 2015
discusses the many ways that these strategies can be counterproductive. See Patel & 
Koushik, supra note 101, at 21 (discussing how the U.K.’s CVE approach explicitly 
focused on extremist speech and ideology rather than violence, which led to poor 
results and mistrust in many Muslim communities); Ankara Memorandum on Good 
Practices for a Multi-Sectoral Approach to Countering Violent Extremism, GLOBAL 
COUNTERTERRORISM F., https://www.thegctf.org/documents/10162/72352/13Sep19_
Ankara+Memorandum.pdf [https://perma.cc/XG2S-QCJZ] (last visited Jan. 8, 
2018).
190. ICCPR, supra note 32, at art. 19; Faurisson v. France, Communication 
No. 550/1993, ¶ 6.1, U.N. Doc. No. CCPR/C/58/D/550/1993 (Nov. 8, 1996); Human 
Rights Comm., General Comment No. 22, ¶¶ 2-3, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4 (July 30, 1993); General Comment No. 34, supra note 52,
¶ 9 (“It is incompatible . . . to criminalize the holding of an opinion.”); ICCPR, 
supra note 32, art. 20(1)-(2) (“1. Any propaganda for war shall be prohibited by law. 
2. Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to 
discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law.”).
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role does personal experience play in mitigating any penalty for 
possessing a radical belief? The answers to these broad questions 
remain contested. States’ focus on “cognitive radicalization” in CVE 
programs make finding the answers to these questions critical.191
Correspondingly, CVE policies also raise related concerns about the 
potential for government censorship.192
Neither Resolution 2178’s broad “extremism” nor the Human 
Rights Council’s 2015 Resolution require an individual to commit a 
violent act to be deemed a violent extremist.193 Indeed, in daily 
parlance, extremism has begun to replace the term violent 
extremism. Like many UN Security Council resolutions, the 
Secretary-General’s Plan of Action also emphasizes the need to 
empower youths and women in the fight against violent extremism 
and radicalization,194 yet what training these youths or women would 
receive is critical to any possible success of this initiative. According 
to the Special Rapporteur, States have used Resolution 2178 to 
crackdown on peaceful protest since it was adopted.195 The broad 
public safety rationales States invoke to withhold information about 
a vulnerable individual’s alleged radicalization may also interfere 
with individuals’ right of access to public information about them.196
Indeed, “whole-of-society” CVE programs could sweep individuals’ 
medical and social service records under States’ public safety 
rationale.197
G. Non-Discrimination and Freedom of Religion Norms
On March 24, 2011, the Human Rights Council adopted 
Resolution 16/18 on combating intolerance; negative stereotyping 
against, negative stigmatization of, discrimination against, and 
negative stereotyping of religion; and incitement to violence and 
191. See General Comment No. 34, supra note 52, ¶ 9.
192. See, e.g., Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 25, ¶ 25, U.N. 
Doc. CCPR/C/Rev.1/Add.7 (Aug. 27, 1996).
193. UN HRC: Resolution on “Violent Extremism” Undermines Clarity,
ARTICLE 19, (Oct. 8, 2015), https://www.article19.org/resources.php/resource/
38133/en/un-hrc:-resolution-on-%E2%80%9Cviolent-extremism%E2%80%9D-
undermines-clarity [https://perma.cc/D5U6-W9AE].
194. S.C. Pres. Statement 2014/21(Oct. 28, 2014).
195. Special Rapporteur A/HRC/31/65, supra note 23, ¶ 21.
196. ICCPR, supra note 32, at art. 19.
197. See infra Section II.G (discussing some of the corresponding issues for 
socioeconomic rights).
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violence against persons based on religion and belief.198 The 
Resolution cited a rise in Islamophobia, anti-Semitism, and racism.199
These problems persist and, by many accounts, have intensified.200 In 
2015, the Human Rights Council adopted a resolution on countering 
violent extremism—without specifying the difference between
incitement to violence and violent extremism—after contentious 
debate.201
Religious freedom, one of the core guarantees of the ICCPR,202
is non-derogable203 but may be subject to some limitations in the 
name of public safety and the fundamental freedoms of others.204
Non-discrimination205 is a basic principle of human rights, and equal 
protection of the laws is guaranteed under the ICCPR.206 Some are 
198. Human Rights Council Res. 16/18, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/16/18, at 1, 
3 (Apr. 12, 2011).
199. Id. at 2.
200. See, e.g., Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations on the Fifth 
Periodic Report of France, ¶ 23, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/FRA/CO/5 (Aug. 17, 2015) 
[hereinafter HRC Concluding Observations on France].
201. Human Rights and Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism, 
supra note 93, ¶ 4.
202. ICCPR, supra note 32, at art. 18(1)-(2) (“1. Everyone shall have the 
right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall include 
freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either 
individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his 
religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching. 2. No one shall be 
subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to adopt a religion or 
belief of his choice.”).
203. See id.
204. See id. at art. 18(3) (“Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs may 
be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to 
protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and 
freedoms of others.”).
205. See id. at art. 2(1) (“Each State Party to the present Covenant 
undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject 
to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction 
of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, property, birth or other status.”). Article 26 is the equal 
protection provision, while Articles 2 and 4 emphasize that states may not 
discriminate based on religion. See id. at art. 2, 4, 26.
206. See id. at art. 26 (“All persons are equal before the law and are entitled 
without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law 
shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective 
protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other 
status.”); Id. at art. 27 (“In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic 
minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, 
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concerned that the government is effectively endorsing an anti-
Islamic position through the substance of its counterterrorism 
programs; “prevention” CVE programs might also fall victim to the 
same critique.207
The Security Council encouraged Member States to cooperate 
with “relevant local communities” to “counter the violent extremist 
narrative that can incite terrorist acts” and “address the conditions 
conducive to the spread of violent extremism,” but Resolution 2178 
does not specify what communities are “relevant” to violent 
extremism.208 The Secretary General’s Plan of Action similarly calls 
for the United Nations to “foster [a] global dialogue, uniting 
countries, people and communities on the basis of universally shared 
values and principles as enshrined in international law,” and believes 
“community leaders are critical in mentoring vulnerable followers so 
as to enable them to reject violent ideologies.”209
CVE programs are prominently critiqued as proxy justifications 
for States to target Muslim communities.210 Augmenting these 
concerns, the United States’ new President, Donald Trump, refers 
narrowly to Islamic terrorism or Islamic extremism, disregarding an 
attempt to be at least facially neutral in addressing both violent 
extremism and terrorism.211 But even a facially neutral approach to 
in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to 
profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language.”).
207. See generally DOES CVE WORK, supra note 2, at 17; Samuel J. Rascoff, 
Counterterrorism and New Deterrence, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 830 (2014) (expressing 
the worry that government programs which employ religion are constitutionally 
troublesome). 
208. S.C. Res. 2178, supra note 6, ¶ 16.
209. Secretary-General Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, supra 
note 7, ¶¶ 36, 56. The Plan of Action also gives a list of specific recommendations 
for engaging communities, including civil society engagement strategies, 
community policing, and locally based mentorship programs. See id. ¶ 51.
210. See, e.g., Letter from ACLU et al., to The Honorable Lisa O. 
Monaco, Assistant to the President for Homeland Sec. & Deputy Nat’l Sec. Adviser, 
supra note 106; see also ‘Radicalization Test’ Ridicule: Anti-terrorism Proposal by 
French Official Sparks Twitter Barrage, RT NEWS (Aug. 10, 2016, 11:10 AM), 
https://www.rt.com/news/355373-test-radicalization-france-schools/ [https://
perma.cc/68UU-4NRZ].
211. See Julia Edwards Ainsley et al., Exclusive: Trump to Focus Counter-
Extremism Program Solely on Islam-Sources, REUTERS (Feb. 1, 2017), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-extremists-program-exclusiv-
idUSKBN15G5VO [https://perma.cc/CGR2-KPZ7]. It is interesting to note that by 
contrast, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin refers to terrorism only as “international 
terrorism.” Andrew E. Kramer, The Phrase Putin Never Uses About Terrorism (and 
Trump Does), N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/01/
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violent extremism leads to concerns that States are de facto 
discriminating by improperly and disproportionately focusing on 
Muslims as suspect.212 For example, States’ disproportionate foci on 
Muslims as potential security threats, whether through legislation 
restricting religious clothing in some cities in France,213 or through 
seeking intelligence at mosques (but not churches), continues to 
interfere with many individuals’ free exercise of religion.214
Remarkably, the right not to be arbitrarily detained may also be 
triggered by CVE programs.215 Reports of possible radicalism may be 
ill-founded but nevertheless trigger targeting by authorities.216 For 
example, in 2016 in the United Kingdom, a Middle Eastern woman 
reading a book about Syria on a flight was reported by a fellow 
traveler as suspicious as a result of her reading material and was 
detained for questioning.217
Some proponents of the broad use of preventive CVE programs 
might argue that the very communities that are allegedly being 
targeted by the government in fact want the help of States to counter 
the forms of violent extremism they find threatening. For example, 
the United States Department of Justice reports that the Somali 
community in Minnesota wants help in stopping the cycle of 
world/europe/vladimir-putin-donald-trump-terrorism.html [https://perma.cc/NA2Z-
G5QB].
212. See PATEL, supra note 81. Despite contrary views put forward by DHS 
and the NCTC, the FBI and the NYPD have relied heavily on monitoring American 
Muslim communities based on the contention that radical Islamic views drive 
violence. See id. at 14, 14 n.95. The influence of this theory can be seen in the 
adoption of it by other local law enforcement agencies. See, e.g., PA. STATE POLICE,
RADICAL ISLAM: A LAW ENFORCEMENT PRIMER (Bill Kaiser ed., n.d.); 
Commonwealth of Va. Dep’t State Police, 2009 Virginia Terrorism Threat 
Assessment, 129 (Mar. 2009), https://www.infowars.com/media/
vafusioncenterterrorassessment.pdf [https://perma.cc/HX8B-5SY3].
213. See, e.g., HRC Concluding Observations on France, supra note 200, ¶ 
22.
214. See Special Rapporteur, Human Rights Council, Rep. on Freedom of 
Religion or Belief, ¶ 42, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/31/18 (Dec. 23, 2015).
215. See General Comment No. 35, supra note 178, ¶¶ 4-5, 39-40 (citing 
Concluding Observations, Human Rights Comm.: U.K. & N. Ir., ¶ 17, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/GBR/CO/6 (July 30, 2008); Fongum Gorji-Dinka v. Cameroon, 
Communication 1134/2002, Human Rights Comm., ¶ 5.1 (2005)). 
216. See id.
217. See British Muslim Held by Anti-Terrorism Police for Reading Syrian 
Art Book, MIDDLE EAST EYE (Aug. 9, 2016), http://www.middleeasteye.net/
news/anti-terror-police-question-muslim-bride-reading-syrian-art-book-plane-
1746856488 [https://perma.cc/MC3Y-D7MD].
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recruitment and criminalization.218 The desire for help from the State 
in recognizing a problem does not, however, justify religious 
targeting or overly criminalized responses, so UN and State efforts 
would be wise to ensure that “conditions [that might be] conducive 
to terrorism” are addressed without securitizing or criminalizing 
social services broadly.219 Indeed, Professor James Forman, Jr.’s 
recent book about how a majority-black jurisdiction participated in 
the over-incarceration of black youth220 provides a cautionary tale in 
this regard. In a separate paper, I address the question of whether 
preventive CVE programs might work with civil society without 
overly securitizing the partnership. 
H. What of Socioeconomic Rights?
CVE programs’ focus on “the Whole of Society Approach” and 
the conditions conducive to terrorism seem to fit neatly with the 
UN’s position that political, economic, and social rights are 
universal, interdependent, and indivisible.221 Partly responding to 
civil society organizations, social and cultural services are included 
in, and even central to, many programs against “violent 
extremism.”222 Many human rights advocates and scholars claim that 
218. See Building Community Resilience, supra note 15, at 2 (“Beginning in 
2007, al-Shabaab began recruiting Somali Minnesotans to fight overseas on behalf 
of the terrorist organization. Many young Somali Minnesotans left, including 26-
year-old Shirwa Ahmed, a Somali-born American citizen, who on October 29, 2008, 
became the first documented American suicide bomber. More than 20 young 
Somalis have been publicly charged in U.S. District Court in Minnesota on 
terrorism-related charges. Recently, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) 
began capitalizing on the tactics used by al-Shabaab to recruit Somali Minnesotans 
to travel overseas to fight. ISIL is using more sophisticated technology, social media 
and personal outreach to target Somali Minnesotans. Since 2013, a large number of 
Somali Minnesotans have traveled, attempted to travel, or taken steps in preparation 
to travel to join ISIL. The Somali Minnesotan community wants this cycle of 
recruitment to stop and have partnered with the U.S. Attorney’s office to buil[d] a 
plan to stop this cycle.”); see also Letter from Special Rapporteur, United Nations 
Support for Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Programs, at 2 (Dec. 24. 2015).
219. Secretary-General Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, supra 
note 7, ¶ 7. 
220. See JAMES FORMAN JR., LOCKING UP OUR OWN: CRIME AND 
PUNISHMENT IN BLACK AMERICA (Farrar et al. eds., 2017).
221. Frazer & Nünlist, supra note 108, at 3.
222. Building Community Resilience, supra note 15, at 2; see also H.M. 
Gov’t, Protecting Vulnerable People from Being Drawn into Terrorism: A Guide for 
Local Partnerships, at 13 (Oct. 2012), http://www.npcc.police.uk/documents/
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the Secretary-General’s Action Plan for CVE marks a welcome shift 
from focusing on retributive, “hard” security approaches to more 
rehabilitative, “soft measures,” including its “Whole of Society” 
approach to fight terrorism.223 CVE programs like those previously 
discussed in Part II, designed to “combat violent extremism in a wide 
variety of states,” engage not just the classic “hard” intelligence and 
law enforcement sectors, but also “soft” sectors previously 
overlooked in domestic security endeavors—including development, 
education, medical care, employment, and social services.224
Some human rights organizations have thus applauded States’ 
attention to CVE programs as being preferable to traditional “hard” 
security programming.225 They see CVE programs as a welcome shift 
that underscores the interdependence of socioeconomic, civil, and 
political rights because relatively “soft” CVE approaches incorporate 
spheres traditionally outside security concerns.226 CVE programs
include consideration of the “conditions conducive to terrorism,” 
including socioeconomic concerns.227 These groups welcome the 
Action Plan’s focus as grounded in the indivisibility of 
socioeconomic and civil and political rights.228 For example, the 
Action Plan readily embraces a gender focus, much more so than 
have previously gender-blind or gender-biased security programs.229
TAM/2012/201210TAMChannelGuidance.pdf [https://perma.cc/RK72-LSK2]; The 
Los Angeles Framework for Countering Violent Extremism, supra note 15, at 1.
223. Frazer & Nünlist, supra note 108, at 2-3. Human Rights First (HRF) 
welcomes the Plan of Action and is urging the U.S. to implement the Secretary-
General’s recommendations. See Modirzadeh, supra note 88. HRF notes “that a 
narrow military approach to security concerns has contributed to radicalization and 
expansion of terrorist violence in several countries during recent years.” Id.
224. See Building Community Resilience, supra note 15, at 4-5 (discussing 
community-identified root causes in building community resilience plan in 
Minneapolis).
225. Id. at 2.
226. See generally WOMEN AND PREVENTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM, CTR. FOR 
HUM. RTS. & GLOBAL JUST. (2012), http://chrgj.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/10/Women-and-Violent-Extremism-The-US-and-UK-
Experiences.pdf [https://perma.cc/45VH-HKWE].
227. PREVENTING TERRORISM AND COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND 
RADICALIZATION THAT LEAD TO TERRORISM 13 (2014).
228. See generally WOMEN AND PREVENTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM, supra 
note 226.
229. For work on the role of gender in counterterrorism initiatives, see Jayne 
Huckerby, Gender, Counterterrorism and International Law, in RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TERRORISM 166-69 (Ben Saul ed., 2014); 
WOMEN AND PREVENTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM, supra note 226. “A gender and 
human rights approach to counter-terrorism queries how, where, and by whom 
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It also focuses on juveniles and seeks rehabilitative approaches for 
juveniles.230 “Whole of Society” approaches might include, for 
example, seeking to create jobs for the unemployed.231
CVE programs command significant security resources and 
personnel within the social services sphere, including for example, 
the United Kingdom’s training and requiring teachers and doctors to 
report signs of radicalization.232 When vital resources such as 
education and medicine are blended with security programs, 
individuals may avoid accessing critical resources, concerned about 
being stigmatized for their beliefs.
III. DILUTION AND DEFERENCE: THE WORRISOME EFFECTS OF THE 
UN’S EMBRACE OF CVE
“The interfaces between national and international law create 
opportunities for mutual self-reflection.”233 Scholars increasingly 
examine international-level power’s effect on individuals and States, 
including, for example, work on global administrative law234 and 
work on international constitutionalism.235
When it embraced CVE programs, the UN created new 
interfaces between the national and international levels, and CVE 
programs are one of the most recent examples of multi-level power 
being applied against individuals. As such, the international-level 
highly contested terms (such as gender, equality, rights, national security, terrorism, 
counter-terrorism) are constructed and deployed.” Jayne C. Huckerby & Margaret L. 
Satterthwaite, A Gender and Human Rights Approach to Counter-Terrorism, in
GENDER, NATIONAL SECURITY, AND COUNTER-TERRORISM 5 (2013).
230. ICCPR, supra note 32, at art. 14(4) (“In the case of juvenile persons, the 
procedure shall be such as will take account of their age and the desirability of 
promoting their rehabilitation.”).
231. G.A. Res. 30/15, supra note 84, at 3.
232. HM GOV’T, CHANNEL DUTY GUIDANCE: PROTECTING VULNERABLE 
PEOPLE FROM BEING DRAWN INTO TERRORISM, 1 (2015), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/4251
89/Channel_Duty_Guidance_April_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/2YP6-ZGW8].
233. Machiko Kanetake, The Interfaces Between the National and 
International Rule of Law: A Framework Paper, in THE RULE OF LAW AT THE 
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LEVELS 1 (Machiko Kanetake & André 
Nollkaemper eds., 2016).
234. See, e.g., Kingsbury et al., supra note 1 (2005) (exploring the 
development of global administrative law).
235. See, e.g., JAN KLABBERS ET AL., THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2009); RULING THE WORLD?: CONSTITUTIONALISM,
INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. 
Trachtman eds., 2009).
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endorsement of CVE programs has implications for cycles of 
deference and contestation between the global and local levels.236
Although international law claims supremacy over domestic 
law, the structure of customary international law allows for debate.237
Recently, as Kadi showed, national-level review of Security Council 
implementation can even, to some degree, inculcate international-
level deference and promote the international-level rule of law.238
Indeed, the focus of this Article, CVE programs, are not too far 
removed from the subject matter challenged in Kadi, wherein the 
EU’s implementation of targeted sanctions was at issue.239 There is 
wide variation at the national and regional levels in understandings 
of the international treaty-based human rights of freedom of opinion 
and expression norms, and this variation is apparent in CVE 
programs.240 However, the UN’s international-level endorsement of 
these CVE programs may induce State practice that is more State-
centered and converges at a lower baseline for rights protections for 
individuals.241
The next two Sections critically examine how the UN, by 
embracing CVE programs at the international level, may affect State 
practice and, as a result, the content of human rights norms. Given its 
notoriously limited enforcement capacity, does the UN’s 
endorsement of these programs have any effect separate from what 
States are already doing at the national level? If so, how does the 
UN’s involvement advance our understanding of how State power 
may or should be used to achieve security goals while still respecting 
human rights, if at all? And how, if at all, might the UN resist low 
national-level legal standards and practices? 
236. See generally Machiko Kanetake & André Nollkaemper, The 
International Rule of Law in the Cycle of Contestations and Deference, in THE RULE 
OF LAW AT THE NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LEVELS 455 (Machiko Kanetake & 
André Nollkaemper eds., 2016).
237. See id.
238. Kadi v. Council of the Eur. Union, 2008 E.C.R. I-06351. See generally
C. Cora True-Frost, The Development of Individual Standing in International 
Security, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1183, 1205-06 (2011) (arguing that the legally 
unaccountable UN Security Council was gradually compelled by regional- and 
national-level challenges such as Kadi to offer more rights protections at the 
international-level).
239. See Kadi, 2008 E.C.R. I-06351.
240. See UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, UNITED NATIONS 
COUNTER-TERRORISM IMPLEMENTATION TASK FORCE (2006), https://www.un.org/
counterterrorism/ctitf/en/un-global-counter-terrorism-strategy [https://perma.cc/
K3E7-25KT].
241. See id.
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This Part conducts a preliminary examination of how the UN’s 
CVE positions can give rise to worrisome effects on human rights 
law, in addition to and independent of national-level CVE 
programming. It explores the dangers presented by UN-endorsed 
CVE programs, such as incentivizing States’ conformity to a low 
human rights baseline. In addition, it raises a concern that States may 
not contest or resist the UN Security Council’s binding authority and 
the Secretary-General’s call for States to develop CVE national 
action plans. If so, then States may very well redirect vital resources 
toward unproven violent extremism programs, shifting funds away 
from essential services, including promoting human rights. The UN 
only recently embraced CVE programming, so we will need to 
continue its study. The next Part examines the potential for the UN’s 
embrace to positively advance human rights, even if along with 
security interests. In addition, contest of meaning and authority arise 
when the UN adopts standards in areas where nations are already 
regulating; this in turn may help promote security initiatives that do 
not sacrifice critical human rights. 
A. Dilution: Will the UN’s Endorsement of CVE Initiatives Invite 
States to Race to the Bottom?
A rich body of international relations, international law, and 
human rights law literature discusses setting legal standards and the 
related concern about races to the bottom. This concern arises here 
because States may interpret the Secretary-General’s Plan of Action 
on CVE as implicitly endorsing existing national counterterrorism 
and CVE measures.242 The UN Security Council’s call to address 
violent extremism in Resolution 2178 and the UN Secretary-
General’s broad, seventy-plus-point Plan of Action, along with other 
UN CVE-initiatives, may lead States to understand that the UN 
approves States’ efforts to date.243
This is problematic as States’ CVE programming often 
conflicts with standards of human rights law. For example, the 
Human Rights Committee, an independent entity, has heavily 
criticized the Russian Federation, a Permanent UN Security Council 
Member, for Russia’s enforcement of violent extremism laws 
242. See generally Secretary-General Plan of Action to Prevent Violent 
Extremism, supra note 7.
243. See S.C. Res. 2178, supra note 6, ¶ 1.
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broadly to crack down on political action and political opposition.244
The Philippines, too, has been criticized for eagerly embracing vague 
definitions of “violent extremism.”245 In Indonesia, also criticized by 
the Human Rights Committee, programming on violent extremism 
has been reported to be most effective when civil society is involved, 
but collaboration with civil society has also reportedly devolved into
“vigilantism.”246 The Philippines has pursued both alleged 
communist and Muslim extremists within its borders—and human 
rights abuses are reported to accompany the pursuit—although 
public opinion polls show that only four percent of the population 
believes that terrorism is a national concern.247 In addition, in China, 
a permanent Security Council Member State, the government targets 
mostly Uighurs, although it has adopted the general rhetoric about 
violent extremism.248 The Human Rights Committee has also 
criticized Kenya’s actions.249 The Kenyan government has 
aggressively implemented CVE initiatives that have been reported to 
have targeted Muslim communities and ignited a backlash because of 
the government’s human rights abuses committed in their 
implementation.250 Further, the Australian government has 
committed to countering violent extremism programs in its 
“Resilience” CVE programs, and controversy about its success or 
failure persists.251 Even in Australia’s more established CVE 
244. See, e.g., Observations of the HRC: Russian Federation, supra note 133,
¶ 7. 
245. See Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations of the Human 
Rights Committee: Philippines, ¶ 14, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/79/PHL (Dec. 1, 2003).
246. See generally Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations on the 
Initial Report of Indonesia, U.N. Doc. No. CCPR/C/IDN/CO/1 (Aug. 23, 2013).
247. See The Philippines: Extremism & Counter-Extremism, COUNTER 
EXTREMISM PROJECT, 9 (2017), https://www.counterextremism.com/sites/
default/files/country_pdf/PH-06272017.pdf [https://perma.cc/HP22-HMZ2].
248. See Alice Su, China Doesn’t Mind Islamic Extremists, FOREIGN POL’Y
(Dec. 16, 2016, 9:30 AM), http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/12/16/china-doesnt-mind-
islamic-extremists/ [https://perma.cc/9YQU-5MN4].
249. See Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations of the Human 
Rights Committee: Kenya, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/83/KEN (Apr. 29, 2005).
250. See Countering Violent Extremism: Myths and Fact, supra note 106;
Kenya: Extremism & Counter-Extremism, COUNTER EXTREMISM PROJECT, 1 (2017), 
https://www.counterextremism.com/sites/default/files/country_pdf/KE-
07122017.pdf [https://perma.cc/B3VD-BF6R].
251. See Dan Box, Programs ‘Don’t Reach Radicals’, AUSTL. (Nov. 20, 
2015), http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/paris-attacks-antiterror-
programs-dont-reach-radicals/news-story/d5108f55da2922fa16a36fd7b0a2f811; 
Michael Keenan, Anti-Extremism Programs Are World’s Best Practice,
AUSTRALIAN, (Nov. 23, 2015), http://www.theaustralian.com.au/opinion/australias-
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programming, however, broad confusion about the difference 
between extremism and radicalization is reported.252 A wide gulf 
separates community members’ and government leaders’ perceptions 
of the fairness of existing counterterrorism measures already under 
way.253 The question whether these programs offer the state more 
latitude to play “dirty tricks” with culture remains unanswered.254
As a descriptive matter, if there is a push at the international-
level for national conformity to international human rights standards 
through socialization,255 the concern that UN-endorsed CVE may 
dilute widely held interpretations of human rights norms to 
accommodate these CVE programs follows. This concern is 
heightened when the norms that are the focus of the socialization are 
norms that broaden States’ power, as opposed to limit it, as is 
arguably the case with CVE programs. Over time, commonly held 
understandings regarding many rights may change as CVE 
programming becomes entrenched in States. Furthermore, the UN’s 
endorsement raises a concern about whether the scope of individual 
liberty protections may be eroded, in part because of the UN’s 
apparent endorsement of CVE programs. If CVE programming faces 
little opposition, scrutiny, or resistance from critical stakeholders, 
security priorities may easily erode individual rights norms. 
B. Deference and Foreclosing Contestation: “Bureaucratic” Effects 
of Secretariat Engagement Requiring States to Create National 
Action Plans and Devote State Resources to CVE
The literature on international organizations describes the 
bureaucratization of obligations and the corresponding pressure on 
States to conform to practices and procedures promoted by 
antiextremism-programs-are-worlds-best-practice/news-
story/0b9ec2093ea99bf0c7ad5b3ad62a3f1f [https://perma.cc/4SCW-RKCJ].
252. See, e.g., Countering Violent Extremism, AUSTL. GOV’T ATT’Y-GEN.’S
DEP’T, https://www.ag.gov.au/NationalSecurity/Counteringviolentextremism/
Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/7UKZ-LQGD] (last visited Jan. 8, 2018).
253. See id.
254. For an example of a state intelligence agency playing dirty tricks with 
culture, see Laurence Zuckerman, How the C.I.A. Played Dirty Tricks with Culture,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/03/18/books/how-the-
cia-played-dirty-tricks-with-culture.html [https://perma.cc/GR8R-2THT].
255. See, e.g., RYAN GOODMAN & DEREK JINKS, SOCIALIZING STATES:
PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS THROUGH INTERNATIONAL LAW (2013) (arguing that 
socialization is a significant causal mechanism in creating change at the 
international level).
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international organizations.256 The United Nations has one of the 
broadest memberships of any international organization257 and 
through its broad membership can encourage compliance with 
international norms, although it lacks corresponding enforcement 
powers. The UN encourages compliance through transparency-
enhancing mechanisms, such as reporting on national action plans, as 
well as through its programming and its agencies and programs. In 
earlier work, I have traced the palpable, operational effects of what 
were otherwise non-binding, broad thematic UN Security Council 
Resolutions.258 I have shown how even nonbinding resolutions 
contribute to the expansion of UN organs’ mandates and may 
gradually be implemented. A principal method the UN uses to 
encourage implementation of its directives has been for the 
Secretary-General to call on all States to adopt National Action Plans 
to pursue the Council’s specific goals.259 These goals may include, 
for example, incorporating a gender focus in conflict operations, 
peacebuilding, and peacekeeping.260
Similarly, the Secretary-General’s Plan of Action further 
promotes CVE programs by, inter alia, calling on States to create 
national action plans on CVE, among other things. Although the 
focus of Resolution 2178 (2014) is primarily foreign terrorist 
fighters, its broader language includes the concern that “violent 
extremism . . . can be conducive to terrorism, sectarian violence, and 
the commission of terrorist acts by foreign terrorist fighters.”261 It 
calls on “States to enhance efforts to counter this kind of violent 
extremism,”262 and to “engage relevant local communities and non-
governmental actors in developing strategies to counter . . . violent 
extremism . . . .”263 As described in Part I, Security Council 
Resolution 2178 (2014) augmented the UN’s counterterrorism 
256. See, e.g., id.; JOSÉ E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS 
LAW-MAKERS (2006); GALIT A. SARFATY, VALUES IN TRANSLATION: HUMAN RIGHTS 
AND THE CULTURE OF THE WORLD BANK (2012).
257. The UN has 193 members; the World Health Organization has 194. 
Annex 1: List of Member States by WHO Region and Mortality Stratum, WORLD 
HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/mental_health/neurology/
annexes_neuro_disorders_public_h_challenges.pdf [https://perma.cc/C6EX-R9LK].
258. See C. Cora True-Frost, The Security Council and Norm Consumption,
40 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 115, 121, 174-75 (2007).
259. Id. at 148, 180.
260. See id. at 180.
261. S.C. Res. 2178, supra note 6, ¶ 1.
262. Id. ¶ 15.
263. Id. ¶ 16.
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architecture;264 as this Article goes to press, the Security Council has 
approved a “comprehensive international framework” and adopted a 
Resolution specifically addressing countering the narratives of 
terrorist groups.265 This framework bears close scrutiny to ascertain 
how, if at all, it addresses the potential human rights violations 
detailed above.
For argument’s sake, assume for the moment that States might 
be motivated to challenge the Council’s use of Chapter VII binding 
power to call on them to do the above. The UN Security Council has 
broad authority and discretion to use Chapter VII to create new 
international legal obligations for States, leaving these dissenting 
States little recourse. As a practical matter, there are no fora for 
States or individuals (who have not been indicted by an international 
ad hoc tribunal) to secure formal and binding (as opposed to 
advisory) international-level legal review of UN Security Council 
Chapter VII resolutions266 such as SC Resolution 2178 (2014). 
Rather, these States will likely have to rely on noncompliance. 
Time will tell, but there is good reason to predict that the UN 
Secretariat’s endorsement of CVE and corresponding call to develop 
national action plans is likely to lead to States’ actual 
implementation of CVE initiatives.267 Although the Secretary-
General seeks to promote human rights in collaboration with CVE 
programs, the Secretary-General’s past calls for national action plans 
in other areas have often led to redirection of priorities, and even 
resources.268 In this case, States that might otherwise have prioritized 
development or social services may be encouraged to redirect related 
resources through security funding, conflating foci of the programs. 
Trust,269 not only legitimacy, in international collaboration is critical. 
264. See supra Section I.B.
265. See sources cited supra note 29.
266. C. Cora True-Frost, Weapons of the Weak: The Prosecutor of the ICC’s 
Power to Engage the UN Security Council, 44 FLA. ST. L. REV. 261, 273 (2017); see 
also Marko Divac Öberg, The Legal Effects of Resolutions of the UN Security 
Council and General Assembly in the Jurisprudence of the ICJ, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L.
879, 885 (2005).
267. See generally TRUST IN INTERNATIONAL POLICE AND JUSTICE 
COOPERATION (Saskia Hufnagel & Carole McCartney eds., 2017).
268. See id.
269. “[T]rust is ‘a matter of judgement and action, in conditions of less than 
perfect information.’” Id. at 1 (quoting Onora O’Neill, Autonomy and Trust in
Bioethics (2001)). “[T]rust as ‘[t]he subjective judgment that a trustor makes about 
the likelihood of the trustee following through with an expected and valued action 
under conditions of uncertainty.’” Id. (quoting Paul C. Bauer, Conceptualizing and 
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As discussed above, CVE programs may diminish civil society’s 
trust in governments. Even as they may broadly identify individuals 
alleged to be at risk of radicalization, they may also correspondingly 
disincentivize vulnerable peoples from seeking assistance from 
governments for fear of being stigmatized. 
IV. INTERNATIONAL CONTESTATION AND DISSENT: HOW THE UN’S
EMBRACE OF CVE MAY HELP PROMOTE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS LAW
The UN has created an international agenda with its 
endorsement of CVE programs and CVE national action plans.270
This agenda invites comment and dissent within the UN, as well as 
from States and transnational advocacy groups.271 Within the UN, 
independent human rights bodies and Special Rapporteurs have 
already raised concerns and even sought to dissent from aspects of 
CVE programs as implemented.272 If vigorous, sustained debate 
about the potentially deleterious effects of CVE programs ensues and 
continues, the UN may be forced to specifically define or design a 
fair CVE program. It will need to further justify comingling security 
and social services.273
In promoting an international agenda for CVE programs, the 
UN also opens itself to contestation from transnational advocacy 
networks and human rights activists concerned about the 
implementation of such programs in their own States. As the UN 
embraces CVE programs as a part of its international-level work, it 
may be required to more carefully consider activists’ voices than it 
might have done if it had not embraced CVE programs. Indeed, its 
willingness to offer members of civil society an opportunity to 
express concerns and challenges to its programs will be essential to 
Measuring Trust and Trustworthiness, in POLITICAL CONCEPTS: COMMITTEE ON 
CONCEPTS & METHODS WORKING PAPER SERIES, Working Paper No. 61 (2015)). 
Trust “concerns expectations and predictions of future behaviour, hence individuals 
rely on trust in order to take a ‘leap of faith’ about present and future performance of 
roles.” Id.
270. See generally IAN HURD, AFTER ANARCHY: LEGITIMACY AND POWER IN 
THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL (2007).
271. Id.
272. Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, supra note 21, ¶ 17.
273. This aspect of CVE programming is of particular interest to me—the 
overlap between earlier human security ideas and CVE highlights a number of 
shared conceptual concerns.
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its maintaining (or attaining) sociological legitimacy. As time 
continues, as was true with Kadi, there may also be indirect 
challenges of UN-endorsed programs from national-level courts. 
Indeed, the UN’s embrace of CVE policies offers an additional 
legal interface outside national court systems. Transnational 
advocates may use the international sphere to leverage rule of law 
and fairness principles in order to challenge national-level 
implementation of these programs. 
A. Setting an Agenda Within the UN and Inviting Contestation from 
Its Varied Organs, Programs, and Bodies 
Even as the global administrative apparati of the UN may 
foreclose contestation in many respects, the UN’s incorporation of 
CVE into its international agenda places these programs squarely 
within the UN’s responsibilities. The UN’s embrace therefore creates 
multiple additional interfaces for contestation of the content of CVE 
programs. The many organs, bodies, and programs of the UN have 
different membership, mandates, and foci, and as a result have 
received the Secretary-General’s endorsement of CVE differently.
Indeed, many entities within the UN have raised concerns 
about the human rights impacts of CVE programs. The UN Human 
Rights Committee and the Special Rapporteurs have voiced both 
indirect and direct concerns about the Secretary-General’s adoption 
of a single Plan of Action on CVE. At present, even among various 
human rights entities such as, on the one hand, the Office of the High
Commission for Human Rights, or on the other, the Human Rights 
Council, there have been varied concerns and reactions to the 
Secretary-General’s Action Plan on CVE. For example, as 
mentioned above, the Human Rights Council enacted a resolution in 
October 2015 that does not clarify whether violent acts are required 
under the definition of violent extremism.274 In late February 2016, 
Ben Emmerson, the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and 
protection of human rights, while countering terrorism, released a 
report responding to and criticizing various aspects of the new 
position embracing CVE programs.275 He raised concerns about the 
Human Rights Council’s failure in its 2015 resolution to specify 
whether violent extremism requires acts, as well as the Council’s 
failure to mention the many abuses civil society has experienced 
274. HRC Res. 30/15, supra note 84, at 2.
275. See Special Rapporteur A/HRC/31/65, supra note 23.
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under CVE programs and initiatives.276 In addition, the ICCPR 
Human Rights Committee has raised concerns relating to how CVE 
programs affect freedom of expression, non-discrimination 
principles, and freedom of movement in their general and state-
specific comments.277 Although UNESCO has fulfilled the Secretary-
General’s directive to produce materials regarding CVE, it has also 
expressed its discomfort with integrating a security concern into 
education and teachers’ work.
Given that CVE and counterterrorism programs unarguably 
expand the scope of States’ authority and discretion, it is perhaps not 
surprising that General Assembly States generally support these 
initiatives.278 As the UN presses its “whole-of-society” approach to 
countering violent extremism, further study is recommended to 
investigate whether state-led bodies, including, for example, the 
Human Rights Council, have been more likely to embrace the 
Security Council and Secretary-General’s CVE initiatives than have 
been independent human-rights specialized bodies. Internal 
questioning and contestation within the UN may lead to greater 
specification of the effectiveness of CVE initiatives in actually 
countering violent extremism, as well as better understanding of 
methods that do or do not work to discourage violent extremism.
B. How the International-Level Embrace of CVE May Create 
Opportunities for Advocates to Contest National Level Practice at 
the International Level and Offer Comparative Lessons for States
The UN’s endorsement offers international legitimacy to CVE 
programs.279 When the UN embraces policies that erode, rather than 
advance, human rights protections on the whole, it is still possible for 
the UN to exert a counter pressure to State practices and seek higher 
standards. CVE programs raise many human rights concerns and 
may not be effective in achieving their rather broadly stated goals—
whether and when counter-radicalization programs will succeed is 
unclear. Nevertheless, there are two ways that the UN’s adoption of 
CVE strategies may help affirm a (marginally) higher baseline for 
human rights in CVE programs. First, if States’ programs are lower 
than the international standards, their legitimacy as rights-respecting 
276. Id. ¶¶ 26-28.
277. General Comment No. 34, supra note 52, ¶¶ 11-12.
278. G.A. Res. 60/288, supra note 8, at 2; S.C. Res. 2178, supra note 6
(violent extremism, here, is defined differently than terrorism).
279. HURD, supra note 270, at 124.
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States will likely be impacted. Second, an international framework 
for CVE enables those outside the UN, including transnational 
advocacy groups, to contest the content and authority of national 
programs. Simply put, UN-endorsed CVE creates an agenda for civil 
society to engage with. 
As for the first, even the UN’s broad endorsement of CVE 
programs articulate limits below which CVE programs would not be 
acceptable. For example, as framed at the international level, CVE 
programs are facially neutral. They address violent extremism in all 
forms and do not explicitly target Muslims. “This is consistent with 
research on counterterrorism that claims that the counterterrorism 
approach should be ‘agnostic about the “Why?” and focus[] on the 
“What?”’”280 Indeed, the Human Rights Council has emphasized that 
“violent extremism, in all its forms and manifestations, cannot and 
should not be associated with any religion, nationality, civilization or 
ethnic group.”281
But, for example, the United States’ President Trump 
reportedly wants to target CVE efforts narrowly at Muslims, and to 
exclude from investigation, for example, Neo-Nazis and far-right 
extremists.282 Narrowing CVE programming to Muslims at the 
national level is not permitted by UN standards.283 The United States 
would certainly face international disapproval if it proceeds with this 
narrow focus. Some may object that the US would face international 
criticism for launching a religiously targeted program regardless of 
the UN’s position. The US program would violate existing 
international human rights law. While it is true that the US would 
face criticism from the treaty bodies, and likely from the Office of 
the High Commissioner for Human Rights, it is less certain that the 
US’s policy would attract the attention of other programs and bodies 
of the United Nations. But endorsing CVE creates multiple interfaces 
for contesting national plans—including, for example, in the 
Secretariat, by the General Assembly, by UNESCO, and by the UN 
Development Programme. They might argue that the UN’s 
280. Peter Bergen, Why Do Terrorists Commit Terrorism?, N.Y. TIMES (June 
14, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/15/opinion/why-do-terrorists-commit-
terrorism.html [https://perma.cc/BQ2F-JBHK].
281. HRC Res. 30/15, supra note 84, at 2.
282. Ainsley et al., supra note 211; Nadim Houry, Trump’s CVE Program: 
Going from Bad to Worse, JUST SECURITY (Feb. 22, 2017), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/37866/good-vs-bad-extremists [https://perma.cc/
QNL9-YJVU].
283. See PATEL, supra note 81, at 8.
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endorsement only serves to mainstream these otherwise concerning 
programs; to some extent, the UN’s endorsement normalizes CVE 
programs. 
However, if CVE programs were implemented at the national 
level only, there would also arguably be fewer opportunities outside 
their nation-state for transnational advocacy networks to actively 
engage the issues they raise. A central challenge for transnational 
advocacy networks is in shaping the international agenda and finding 
places where it is easy for them to intervene. As it stands, civil 
society can leverage the international attention the UN has given 
CVE programs in any one of the many interfaces created by the 
UN’s endorsement. In the United States, various civil society 
organizations have recently refused significant grants from the US 
government out of concern that their cooperation would be abused.
CONCLUSION 
Whether the international-level embrace of CVE programs will 
in fact curb “violent extremism” and enhance individuals’ lives is a 
question this Article cannot answer, but the success of preventative 
CVE programs targeting “vulnerable individuals” will turn on civil 
society’s perceptions of government action. Many preventative CVE 
programs embody the intuition that addressing the “conditions 
conducive to terrorism,” through, for example, outreach, 
development programs, and social services, is critical to 
discouraging terrorism. 
As this Article has argued, quite apart from the continuing 
scholarly debate, the UN’s embrace of CVE programs offers 
credibility and legitimacy both to this intuition and to the many 
varied national-level programs that purport to be doing CVE. Over 
time, the content of some international human rights norms, 
particularly those related to freedom of religion, association, and 
speech, may be diluted by a rush to conformity with national action 
plans that do not adequately protect and promote these norms. 
Absent human rights-respecting models of preventive CVE 
programs, the UN’s call for National Action Plans and the UN’s 
embrace of CVE programs, could, in limited ways, help to reframe 
some States’ interventions to promote both security and human 
rights. After all, the UN’s embrace of CVE programming allows 
contests of meaning and authority between the State and the IO, 
which in turn may help promote security initiatives that do not 
sacrifice critical human rights. Still, such programs undeniably have 
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contributed to an ever-expanding scope of State security actions, and 
have raised limitations for the development of many international 
human rights laws in the ways described above. 
For the foregoing reasons, the international community’s 
embrace of CVE programs has not only enabled the UN to promote 
human rights within these programs, it also appears to have 
constrained it in further expanding and developing human rights law 
as a preliminary matter. As these programs continue to be 
implemented, further study of their effects on international human 
rights law and security is imperative.
